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BEYOND METAPHOR: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND
THE FICTION OF THE WORK*
ROBERT H. ROTSTEIN**
"After changes upon changes,
we are more or less the same."1
INTRODUCTION
It would be unthinkable for a court to decide a patent or a products
liability case without at least trying to understand how the new invention
works or how the supposedly defective product malfunctioned. Patent
courts, for example, do not hesitate to employ the latest scientific and
engineering concepts in reaching decisions. In sharp contrast, although
copyright law regulates the literary "work," it has largely ignored the
insights of contemporary literary criticism-the branch of scholarly in-
vestigation that is concerned with how "works of authorship" operate.
On the theory that courts cannot make truly intelligent determinations
about the subject of copyright without understanding how that subject
functions, this Article examines copyright law in light of principles of
contemporary literary criticism.
The quotation at the beginning of this Article provides a starting
point for that examination. At their 1981 reunion concert in New York's
Central Park, singers Paul Simon and Art Garfunkle performed the song
The Boxer before an estimated crowd of 500,000.2 On hearing the lines
quoted above, the vast audience cheered in unison. At that moment, the
audience members were engaged in an act of interpreting a literary work.
Translated into copyright parlance, this was an example of "audience
response."' 3
During the 1960s, Simon & Garfunkle were highly successful re-
cording artists.4 They first released a recorded version of The Boxer in
* Copyright 0 1993 Robert H. Rotstein
** Partner, Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, Beverly Hills, California. I am especially indebted to
Peter Jaszi for his insights and his encouragement. I am also grateful to Mark Rose, Wendy
Gordon, and Kenneth Port. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of
California Humanities Research Institute.
1. PAUL SIMON, The Boxer, on THE REUNION CONCERT IN CENTRAL PARK (Columbia
Records 1981).
2. Rhymin'Simon Packs 'em in, USA TODAY, August 16, 1991, § IA (reporting on Simon's
1991 solo concert in Central Park and describing the previous 1981 concert).
3. See infra text accompanying note 233.
4. See DAVE MARSH, THE HEART OF ROCK & SouL 509 (1989).
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1969, later performing the song at live concerts.5 In those early live per-
formances, the quoted lines did not elicit any particularly noteworthy
response from the audience. In 1970, the pair ended their relationship.6
The 1981 reunion concert marked the first time that they had performed
together in concert since. Between 1969 and 1981, therefore, something
had changed, resulting in an audience response to The Boxer different
from the one that the song had previously elicited.
The example of The Boxer reflects concerns raised in much contem-
porary literary thought, concerns that have significance for the current
system of copyright. On the one hand, the song The Boxer did not, over
the years, have a single identity. That is, the audience response to the
song was sensitive to context. Indeed, even verbatim renditions occur-
ring only a few years apart evoked different responses and generated, it
could be argued, different songs. Put differently, the identity of the song
did not depend on something inherent in the "song." The audience's
response to the song related to factors external to the song-age of the
audience, experiences during the 1960s, familiarity with the performers'
work, and undoubtedly other cultural and social factors. The question
for copyright law becomes whether this mutability of a work of author-
ship somehow renders a trier of fact unable to make determinations of
similarity, determinations that would seem to depend on the works under
scrutiny having a fixed identity.
On the other hand, the example of The Boxer shows that much
about acts of interpretation is determinate within a particular context.
Empirically and given a common discourse, a large group of people-an
"audience"--can agree on many things about a work's meaning and can
even immediately respond to the work in the same way. Many in the
large audience in Central Park shared strategies of interpretation and re-
sponse. Evidence could be brought to bear as to why the audience mem-
bers responded differently from the way they had in the late 1960s, yet
also why the audience nevertheless regarded the two renditions of the
song (the song as performed in 1969 and the song as performed in 1980)
as "substantially similar" (in fact, identical). The question becomes for
copyright whether the law can adequately identify those factors that al-
low an audience to react consistently to a particular work, such that tri-
ers of fact can meaningfully compare two works to determine whether
infringement has occurred.
5. Id The original recorded version of the song omitted the verse containing the lines quoted
at the beginning of the section. See PAUL SIMON, The Boxer (Columbia Records 1969).
6. See DAvE MARSH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Rocic AND ROLL; THE 1001 GREATEST SINGLES
EVER MADE (1991).
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The central thesis of this Article is that current copyright dogma
does not recognize that so-called "works of authorship" are, as the Si-
mon & Garfunkle example shows, unstable and dependent on context.
Copyright law, rather, embraces the notion of the "work"-purportedly
an autonomous entity akin to an object. According to copyright law, the
"work" supposedly has immutable characteristics that allow judges and
juries to determine originality, scope of protection, substantial similarity,
and fair use merely by interpreting the words on the page (or the pictures
on the screen or the sounds on the recording). Contemporary literary
theory has vigorously debated the significance of the mutability of
"works of authorship." Most importantly, recent literary thought calls
into question copyright law's idea of the "work," instead positing the
concept of "text. ' 7 "The 'text' may be literary, visual, or aural (or any
combination of these); whatever form it takes, it is created not in the act
of writing but in the act of reading." s Unlike the stable and autonomous
"work," which the law treats as akin to an object, the text is a process-
an act of speech that occurs when a member of an audience (a reader,
viewer, listener, computer operator) interacts with the textual artifact
(that is, the book, motion picture, song, or computer program).9 Thus,
for example, the song The Boxer in 1969 was a different "text" from The
Boxer in 1981, because the listeners in each case "created" different texts.
It is not surprising that literary theorists themselves have begun to
issue direct challenges to the present system of copyright.' 0 And indeed,
the concerns of contemporary literary thought parallel those of copyright
law. Recent theory has questioned the concepts of "work," "author,"
"audience response," and "similarity," concepts that provide the under-
pinnings for much of current copyright doctrine. If contemporary critics
are correct that the "text" is not immutable, then copyright law's idea of
the "work" as an autonomous object capable of consistent interpretation
is theoretically unsound.
This Article demonstrates that, in many crucial instances, the belief
that the "work" is fixed and autonomous results in wrongheaded reason-
7. Eg., Roland Barthes, From Work to Text, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN
POST-STRUCTURALLST CRITICISM 73 (Josue V. Harari ed., 1979) (hereinafter TEXTUAL
STRATEGIES].
8. Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 'Authorship," 1991
DUKE LJ. 455, 458 n.9 (1991). This Article will use the term "text" in this sense. It will use the
term "work" to refer to the notion that the text has its own autonomy, akin to an object. See infra
part I.B.
9. See infra part I.F. Similarly, while copyright embraces the notion of "author," much con-
temporary literary theory has questioned the usefulness of this concept. The seminal challenge
comes from Michael Foucault, What IsAn Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES, supra note 7, at 141.
10. See, e.g., infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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ing and unsatisfactory decisionmaking. 1  After briefly tracing the histor-
ical development of the literary constructs of "work" and "text," the
Article examines the key tenets of copyright-originality, idea/expres-
sion, substantial similarity-in light of current literary thought. As to
each of these tenets, the Article first examines copyright's view of the
text, concluding that the central assumption underlying current copy-
right doctrine is that the "work" is fixed and autonomous. The Article
next posits that, as to each aspect of copyright law, the concept of
"work" can lead to highly problematic techniques of decisionmaking. In
particular, the concept of "work" fosters the illusion that a judge or jury
can find a single valid interpretation of a work in a copyright case and on
that basis make sound decisions. As a result, the courts often fail to
confront the true policy considerations underlying a particular decision.
As to each aspect of copyright, the Article suggests how the insights of
current literary thought might provide a more useful framework in copy-
right for addressing the inevitable instability of the text.12
1I. Specifically, the assumption in copyright that a "work's" true meaning lies within its four
comers allows judges to adopt one of many plausible interpretations and adopt it as the valid inter-
pretation of the work. Moreover, even if subconsciously, the very construct of the "work" as a fixed
object tends to discourage decisionmakers in copyright cases from examining the policies underlying
their decisions. That is, the autonomous "work" often serves as an obfuscatory rhetorical device,
permitting courts to deflect policy challenges to certain results. For example, courts have deflected
free speech challenges to copyright protection by recasting the First Amendment issue as whether
the defendant has misappropriated the "fruits" of the plaintiff's "labor." In this sense, copyright's
reification of what is really verbal conduct permits decisionmaking in copyright infringement cases
that does not fully air the First Amendment issues, a tendency that some commentators have
roundly criticized. Eg., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Indi-
vidualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993).
12. This Article's approach finds precedent in recent attempts to apply literary theory to other
areas of the law. For a number of years, both literary and legal scholars have explored the impact of
literary criticism on constitutional and statutory interpretation. As just a few examples of the diver-
gent approaches in the realm of literary criticism, see WAYNE BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP
(1988); JOHNATHAN D. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUC-
TURALISM (1982); UMBERTO Eco, THE Limrrs OF INTERPRETATION 44 (1990); JOHN M. ELLIS,
AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989); STANLEY E. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS: THE
AUTHORrY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY OF INTERPRETA-
TION (1967); TEXTUAL STRATEGIES, supra note 7; ROBERT E. HOLUB, RECEPTION THEORY: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1984); WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AES-
THETIC RESPONSE (1978); STEVEN KNAPP & WALTER B. MICHAELS, AGAINST THEORY (W.
Mitchell ed., 1982) [hereinafter AGAINST THEORY]; ROBERT E. SCHOLES, TEXTUAL POWER: LIT-
ERARY THEORY AND THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH (1985); READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM: FROM
FORMALISM TO POST-STRuCTURALISM (Jane P. Tompkins ed., 1980) [hereinafter READER-RE-
SPONSE CRITcISM]; IDENTrrY OF THE LrTERARY TEXT (Mario J. Valdes & Owen J. Miller eds.,
1985). For analogous legal studies, see, eg., INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: HERMENEU-
TIc READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTrru-
TIONAL FAITH (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION (1988); James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 2014 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Mover" An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal
Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REv. 929 (1988); Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96
YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Steve Fuller,
[Vol. 68:725
BEYOND METAPHOR
In suggesting a reevaluation of how copyright approaches the
"work," this Article suggests an alternative structure-a different way of
looking at what copyright protects-that can bring the policies underly-
ing the central decisions in a copyright case into sharper focus. In this
sense, the Article is descriptive rather than prescriptive. For example,
certain of the observations in the Article might seem to call for greater
copyright protection for a particular "work" than the present system
provides; others might appear to call for less protection. Although the
Article suggests certain consequences that might arise out of recognizing
that the copyrighted "text" inevitably functions as contemporary literary
critics say it does, the pivotal thrust of the Article is that one cannot
begin to evaluate the wisdom of various approaches to copyright law-
Comment, Playing Without a Full Deck Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory,
97 YALE L.J. 549 (1988); Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern
Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 145 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation
Reargued, 72 VA. L. REv. 1351 (1986); L. H. La Rue, Posner on Literature, 85 MIcH. L. PEv. 325
(1986); John D. Ayer, The Very Idea of "Law and Literature," 85 MICH. L. REv. 895 (1987); Inter-
pretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL L. REv. 1 (1985).
Only recently have the commentators begun to examine copyright principles in light of modern
critical thought. Eg., Rosemary . Coombe, Objects of Propery and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1853 (1991). Wendy J. Gordon, Reality
as Artifact From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1992); Wendy J. Gordon,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problems of Private Censorship,
57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1009, 1030-37 (1990) [hereinafter Jurisprudence of Benefits]; Jaszi, supra note 8;
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY LJ. 965 (1990); Laurie Sterns, Note, Copy Wrong:
Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REv. 513 (1992).
Simultaneously, copyright has come under scrutiny from other quarters. See, eg., Monroe E.
Price, Reexamining Intellectual Property Concept" A Glimpse into the Future Through The Prism of
Chakrabarty, 6 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 443 (1988); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Deci-
sionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 719 (1987); Neil
Harris, Who Owns Our Myths? Heroism and Copyright in an Age of Mass Culture, 52 Soc. REs. 241
(1985); Michael D. Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringe-
ment Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. Rav. 127 (1988). For example, commentators have addressed copy-
right's ability to cope with advances in technology. Eg., David G. Golden, Toward a Unified Theory
of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technological Era 16 INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 365
(1984); Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Commu-
nications World, 16 COPYRIGHT L. SyMp. (ASCAP) 30 (1968); John KL Halvey, Comment, A Rose
by Any Other Name Computer Programs and the Idea-Expression Distinction, 34 EMORY L.J. 741
(1985); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41
STAN. L. REv. 1045 (1989); Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression: Deter-
mining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REv.
866 (1990); Susan A. Dunn, Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software,
38 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1986); Vance F. Brown, Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and
Computer Software: An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L.
REv. 977 (1988). Others have examined copyright's usefulness as an economic incentive to produce
creative material. Eg., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection for
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the
Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 1343 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970).
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whether the perspective be economic, Lockean, or grounded in freedom
of speech-unless one understands what is being evaluated.
I. LITERARY CRITICISM'S CHANGING VISION OF THE TEXT
In the following pages, this Article suggests that copyright law
should not slavishly regard the text as a self-contained, autonomous
"work" that has one valid meaning independent of how an audience ap-
proaches it. To those who are not steeped in recent literary criticism or
who regard current literary thought as a dangerous fad, such a sugges-
tion might seem to be a major departure from the norm. However, the
history of critical literary thought shows that, if anything, the concept of
the autonomous "work" is the aberration.
The following discussion of historical developments in literary
thought is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, it summarizes the way
literary thinkers have conceived of the text, providing a springboard for
assessing copyright's current treatment of the "work."
A. Criticism from the Classical Period to the Renaissance
The concept of the text as a mode of action dates back at least to
antiquity. Mark Rose writes: "From the classical period through the
Renaissance, the dominant conception of literature was rhetorical. A
text was conceived less as an object than as an intentional act, a way of
doing something, of accomplishing some end such as "teaching and de-
lighting."1 3 Plato viewed the artistic text as an imitation of nature that
could corrupt the reader.14 Aristotle described tragedy "as an imitation
not only of a complete action, but of events inspiring fear or pity."15
Other classical critics also focused on the rhetorical aspects of a text,
debating matters of technique and the morality of literary production,
13. Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern
Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 63 (1988) [hereinafter Author as Proprietor]; MARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNRS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript) [here-
inafter AUTHORS AND OWNERS].
14. Plato, Ion, in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE PLATO 15 (Hazard Adams ed., 1992) [hereinafter
CRITICAL THEORY]. The Platonic text is not the truth, but can have a "sweet influence" on the
recipient. Plato, Republic, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra, at 35; Laws, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra.
at 45. For Plato, the poet is in effect a plagiarist, since he or she imitates nature, falsely purporting
to know the truth.
15. Aristotle, Poetics, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 55. See also Longinus, On the
Sublime, in CRmCAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 77 ('The effect of elevated language upon an
audience is not persuasion but transport."); Horace, Art of Poetry, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note
14, at 66 ("[11f you are nice and careful in combining your words, you may gain the finest effects in
language by the skillful setting which makes a well-known word new.").
(Vol. 68:725
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and emphasizing the audience's behavior in relation to the text.16 For
these critics, the text served as a force acting on the world, not as an
object to be deciphered.1 7 Response of the reader was action or behavior,
not the process of discovering a fixed textual meaning.18 The conception
of the text as an object with a fixed identity had no place during that
period.19
Critics during the Middle Ages and Renaissance continued to ap-
proach the text in terms of its effect on the audience.20 "'The qualities of
a poem were to be sought through the study of its effects upon an audi-
ence.' "21 In light of the patronage system, the text was considered a
form of influence, and a means of performing a social task; the text was
valued for what it could do.22 However, critics also began to treat the
author as a creator, a "maker" of the text or even a form of deity; the
dominant image during this period was paternity, and the text became
the child of the author, sowing the seeds of the vision of the text as a
"thing." 23 Still, during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centu-
16. Tompkins, The Reader in History, in READER-RESPONSE CRITIcisM, supra note 12, at 204-
05.
17. Id at 203.
18. Id at 206.
19. "The text as an object of study or contemplation has no importance in this critical perspec-
tive, for literature is thought of as existing primarily in order to produce results and not an end in
itself." Id at 205-06; see ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 13, at 22.
20. See, ag., Manlius Severinus Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, in CRITIcAL THEORY,
supra note 14, at 115 ("[The Muses of Poetry] stifle the fruit bearing harvest of reason with the
barren briars of passions; they do not free the minds of men from disease but accustom them
thereto."); Giovanni Boccaccio, Life of Dante, in CRmcAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 124 ("In like
manner do poets in their works-which we term poetry-sometimes under fictions of various gods,
again by the transformation of men into imaginary forms, and at times by gentle persuasion, reveal
to us the causes of things, the effects of virtues and of vices, what we ought to flee and what follow; in
order that we may attain by virtuous action the end that they, although they did not rightly know
the true God, believed to be our supreme salvation."); Julius Cawsar Scaliger, Poetics, in CRrTICAL
THEORY, supra note 14, at 138 ("By no means are we to accept the popular idea that eloquent
speaking, rather than persuasion, is the end of oratory .... ); Lodovico Castelvetro, The Poetics of
Aristotle, Translated and Explained, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 136 ("[P]oetry has been
found solely to delight and recreate; and I say to delight and recreate the minds of the vulgar multi-
tude and common people."); Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra
note 14, at 146 (poets "teach and delight"); Tompkins, supra note 16, at 207; ROSE, AUTHORS AND
OWNERS, supra note 13, at 21-22.
21. Tompkins, supra note 16, at 207, quoting 2 BERNARD W EitERa, A HISTORY OF LITER-
ARY CRITICISM IN THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE 801, 805 (1961). This audience consisted of wealthy
and highly placed individuals who were in a position to dispense patronage to the producer of the
text.
22. Id. at 209. Eg., Scaliger, Poetics, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 137 (poetry
"imitates that it may teach").
23. RosE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS. supra note 13, at 61-62 and examples cited therein. See
also Scaliger, Poetics, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 139-40 ("the poet depicts quite an-
other sort of nature, and a variety of fortunes; in fact, by so doing, he transforms himself almost into
a second deity"); Castelvetro, The Poetics of Aristotle Translated and Explained, in CRITICAL THE-
ORY, supra note 14, at 135 (the subject matter of poetry should resemble that of history but should
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ries, the view of the text as action rather than as object remained firmly
embedded in literary theory, particularly because of the prominence of
satire, the genre that dominated the writing of the era.24 Poetic utterance
in this period had a dynamic nature and was concerned, again, with
action.2"
Importantly, during these many centuries, copyright law as we
know it did not exist.26 Because the text was conceived, not as some
object of property owned by the author, but as action imitative of nature,
the concept of protection of a "work" of authorship had no basis for
development.27 Copying, in the sense of imitating previous great poets
and writers, was a laudable objective rather than an unethical or immoral
act of theft.28
B. The Emergence of the "Work"
The concept of "work" as an autonomous object-and the birth of
copyright law-arose more or less at the same time. The literary critical
conception of a text as autonomous "property" began to develop only
during the second half of the eighteenth century, with the breakdown of
the patronage system29 and with the increased audience accompanying
the rise of commercial printing.30 Because the author's subsistence de-
pended on sales of his or her printed "work," the personal relationship
that the author had with the audience-formerly, his or her patrons-no
not be identical because the poet "would not deserve that praise by which he is thought to be more
divine than human"); Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 145
("Only the poet... doth grow in effect another nature, in making things either better than nature
bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature...."); id. at 146 (poet is a
"maker").
24. Tompkins, supra note 16, at 211. Satire was intended to engender action in an audience and
thus focused on audience response.
25. Id at 212.
26. See Rose, Author as Proprietor, supra note 13, at 54-55.
27. "Epic poetry and tragedy, comedy also and dithyrambic poetry, and the music of the flute
and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation."
Aristotle, Poetics, in CRTICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 48. Similarly, for Plato, the text comes
from God; the poet is the imitator. Plato, Republic, in CRmcAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 35.
28. Longinus writes:
This writer shows us, if only we were willing to pay him heed, that another way (beyond
anything we have mentioned) leads to the sublime. And what, and what manner of way,
may the be? It is the imitation and emulation of previous great poets and writers.... Was
Herodotus alone a devoted imitator of Homer? No, Stesichorus even before his time, and
Archilochus, and above all Plato, who from the great Homeric source drew to himself
innumerable tributary streams.... This proceeding is not plagiarism; it is like taking an
impression from beautiful forms or figures or other works of art.
Longinus, On the Sublime, in CRMCAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 85-86.
29. Rose, Author as Proprietor, supra note 13, at 55 ("In a complex system of material and
immaterial benefits, patrons honored and sustained worthy authors and themselves received honor
and status in return.").
30. Tompkins, supra note 16, at 214; see Rose, Author as Proprietor, supra note 13, at 55-56.
[Vol. 68:725
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longer existed. From the late seventeenth century through the nine-
teenth century and the coming of the Romantic age, the text evolved into
a commodity, a piece of property.31 In this period, literary criticism be-
came a science, and the text became an object of scholarly and scientific
investigation. 32 Moreover, the text-by this time, the "work"--finally
began to be conceived as the product of creative genius, measured by its
"coriginality. ' 33
Simultaneously, the idea of the "work" in copyright law "denomi-
nating a freestanding abstraction as the subject of literary property" also
emerged during the latter half of the eighteenth century, ultimately re-
flecting (and perhaps arising out of) the individuation of author in liter-
ary criticism.3 4 The historical development of the notion of "author"
and "work" in copyright law in England and the United States has been
well chronicled. 35 These historians show that the existence of a system
of copyright depended on the characterization of the text as "work," akin
to an object that had stability and permanence and that thus could be
"commodified." 36
C. The Romantic Approach to "Author" and "Work"
With the emergence of the notion of "work" came the notion of
originality and the ascendance of the author-genius as the central focus
of critical studies. During the nineteenth century, with criticism's em-
phasis on creative originality and genius, literary study focused on the
author as the central object of literary studies. For example, Word-
sworth wrote that "[p]oetry is produced by a man of more than usual
organic sensibility." 37 According to this Romantic vision of authorship,
31. Tompkins, supra note 16, at 218-19.
32. Id, at 215-16.
33. Rose, Author as Proprietor supra note 13, at 54-55, 75-76; Jaszi, supra note 8, at 467.
34. Jaszi, supra note 8, at 473.
35. Eg., RosE, AuTHoRs AND OwNERs, supra note 13; Rose, Author as Proprietor, supra note
13; Howard D. Abrams, Historic Foundation of Copyright Law, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119 (1983); L.
RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UN-
HURRIED ViEw OF COPYRIGHT (1967).
36. See Jaszi, supra note 8, at 473.
37. William Wordsworth, Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads, in CRITICAL THE-
ORY, supra note 14, at 435; Rose, Author as Proprietor, supra note 13, at 54-55, 75-76. What Peter
Jaszi describes as this "Wordsworthian vision" of the text, Jaszi, supra note 8, at 459 & n.11, per-
vaded literary criticism of the period. Eg., William Blake, Annotations to Reynolds' Discourses, in
CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 408 ("genius dies with its possessor and comes not again till
another is born with it"); i. at 439, 441 ('Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge-it is as
immortal as the heart of man .... [It] is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings; it takes its
origin from emotion recollected in tranquility."); John Keats, Letter to George and Thomas Keats, in
CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 474 ("if poetry comes not as naturally as the leaves to a tree it
had better not come at all"); Edgar Allen Poe, The Poetic Principle, in CRmCAL THEORY, supra
note 14, at 575.
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the work that was original reflected the author's genius and enjoyed a
privileged relationship vis-d-vis the higher arts. The work remained sub-
servient to something "outside" itself, namely, the author-genius, who
dominated the critical discourse. Moreover, critical thought continued
to consider the reader's response to the work. Although the "work" in
the Romantic period was no longer, as in earlier periods, conceived of as
a mode of action, Coleridge could nonetheless write that the text permit-
ted the reader "to transfer from [his or her] inward nature a human in-
terest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of
imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which
constitutes poetic faith."'38
Given the focus on the author as the creator of the text, academic
criticism of the late nineteenth century emphasized biographical and his-
torical study. 39 In this sense, also, the work was not conceived as a sef-
contained object, but took shape within a broader historical and literary
context. Extratextual information about the author's life and judgments
about the work's place in the aesthetic hierarchy still made factors exter-
nal to the work relevant to the critical inquiry.
D. Modernism and the New Criticism: The Rise of the Autonomous
"Work"
During the first half of the twentieth century, modernism sup-
planted Romantic thought as the dominant mode of criticism. Modern-
ism's goal was to develop "objective science, universal morality and law,
and autonomous art according to their inner logic." 4 Broadly, modern-
ism denied that works of art were bound by connections to history and
context.41 Such thought was particularly influenced by the New Criti-
cism, which developed as a reaction to the Romantic notion of genius
and the academic pre-eminence of historical study. In New Critical the-
ory, "work" replaced "author" as the central unifying force in literary
criticism. This version of modernist thought conceived of the creative
38. Samuel T. Coleridge, BIOGRAPHiA LITERARIA, ch. 14, reprinted in 5 ENGLISH LrrERA-
TURE: THE RoMAmc PERIOD (Albert G. Reed ed., 1929). As discussed later, this passage was
quoted in Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990), a case that focuses on the issue of
substantial similarity.
39. CRrTICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 1014.
40. Elizabeth H. Wang, (Re)Productive Right" Copyright and the Postmodern Artist, 14
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 261, 262 n.12 (1990) (quoting Harbermas, Modernity--An Incomplete
Project, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE 9 (Hal Foster ed., 1983)).
41. Wang, supra note 40, at 263 n.12 (quoting Brian Wallis, What's Wrong With This Picture?
An Introduction, in ART AFrER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION at xiii (Brian Wallis
ed., 1984)).
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work as autonomous and ahistorical. 42 The New Criticism argued that
the literary text was properly considered an object of knowledge, as
"meaning" rather than as "doing," 43 and that literary meaning does not
depend on authorial intention44 or audience response,45 but that the
work is self-contained like architecture.46 Such modernist literary
thought fully objectified the "work," conceiving of it as a self-contained,
autonomous object whose identity existed separate from other "works,"
from an author, and from cultural and historical context.47
E. The Decline of the Work in Literary Thought
The modernist notion of the self-contained work proved dubious to
literary scholars, who began to attack it in diverse ways. During the
1960s, Structuralist thinkers sought to place the text in a broader context
by applying linguistic theories to the study of literary texts.43 Structural-
ist criticism characterized the text not as an object that had an identity
42. This, along with other modernist paradigms, is discussed in AsrTADuR EYSrEINssoN, THE
CONCEPT OF MODERNISM 10-12 (1990).
43. Tompkins, supra note 16, at 222. Now, "honest criticism and sensitive appreciation are
directed not upon the poet but upon the poetry." T.S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in
CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 761. According to Eliot, the poet has not a personality to
express, but a particular medium. Id at 762.
44. W.K. Wimsatt & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in CRITICAL THEORY,
supra note 14, at 945. Authorial intention and design are neither available nor desirable as a stan-
dard for judging the success of a work of literary art. According to Wimsatt and Beardsley: "Judg-
ing a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands that it work. It is only because an
artifact works that we infer the intention of the artificer. A poem should not mean but be." Id. at
1015. See SCHOLEs, supra note 12, at 47.
45. "The affective fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and what it
does) . w..." . K. Wimsatt & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Affective Fallacy, in CRITICAL THEORY,
supra note 14, at 952.
46. CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL-WROUGHT URN: STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF POETRY
204-05 (1975).
47. Such "text centered" criticism assumes that the literary work of art is unique and valuable;
that literary meaning is contained in the words on the page; and that special training in the critical
process is necessary if the student of literature is to grasp the full extent of what the work has to
offer. Tompkins, Preface, in READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM, supra note 12, at x. As Jonathan
Culler describes it, under the New Criticism: "the poem is not simply a series of sentences; it is
spoken by a persona, who expresses an attitude to be defined, speaking in a particular tone which
puts the attitude in one of various possible modes or degrees of commitment." JONATHAN CULLER,
THE PURSUIT OF SIrNS 4 (1981). According to Culler, the New Criticism saw literature as an
encounter between "innocent reader and autonomous text." Id. at 12. Literary response became a
meaningless category, "since the chief object of critical concern is not the effects that poems have but
their intrinsic nature." Tompkins, supra note 16, at 221. Only through objective study of the work
itself-and not through study of the reader-could the work's true emotive effect be realized. Id.
Moreover, literary criticism emerged as a discipline separate from other disciplines, and the critic
played the central role in interpreting the work, becoming a teacher of meanings who enabled the
audience to have the correct response to the work. See, eg., Wimsatt & Beardsley, in CRrIcAL
THEORY, supra note 14, at 1018. According to Wimsatt and Beardsley, criticism of poetry and
author psychology are two different disciplines. The work itself contains internal evidence for its
own meaning. Id.
48. See CULLER, supra note 47, at 25 (describing history of Structuralism and Semiotics, which
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separate and apart from the reader, but as a system of signs and conven-
tions that the reader assimilates and that give the text meaning.49 Ac-
cording to these critics, context is highly significant in interpretation; the
text is not self-contained, as the New Critics asserted, but instead can be
understood only in light of broader social, cultural, and linguistic
concerns.
Structuralism nonetheless sought to preserve the identity of the text,
redefining that identity in terms of supposedly ascertainable signs and
symbols.50 Though not a cohesive movement, during the 1970s and
1980s, post-structuralist theorists began to question whether the text had
any stable meaning at all, or rather had a meaning that varied depending
on the particular reader or reading. 51
Broadly, critics who questioned the modernist notion of self-con-
tained work were motivated by, among other things, the observation that
a diverse group of readers were apparently unable to agree on a single
meaning of a text and the inability of even a single reader to reach a
consistent conclusion about the meaning of a text upon successive read-
ings.52 Although the approaches are not uniform or even consistent, sev-
eral generalizations about post-structuralist thought are salient to
copyright law. Most post-structuralist thought emphasizes "the ubiquity
of interpretation in the process of reading every text."' 53 Particularly
salient to copyright scholarship is the shift of critical emphasis from the
"work" as an object of study to "reader" (or in the language of copy-
right, "audience"). The reader in effect creates the text by virtue of the
broader context in which he or she exists. 54 For this reason, the text does
"[seek] to describe the underlying systems of distinctions and conventions that enable objects and
activities to have meaning").
49. Culler, Literary Competence, in READER-REsPONSE CRITICISM, supra note 12, at 104.
50. Eco, supra note 12, at 44.
51. See Wang, supra note 40, at 262 n.12.
52. More specifically, the post-structuralist debate began in response to a number of develop-
ments in literary theory beginning with the New Criticism. First, the demise of Romantic sources of
thought undermined the view of the text as a self-contained organic structure. Second, movements
like Structuralism challenged the notion of literature as distinct from other forms of verbal utter-
ance, instead treating all texts as being subject to an overriding linguistic structure. Third, beginning
with the New Criticism, genre, tradition, and literary canon weakened. Fourth, the Romantic notion
of the individual author as a unifying force suffered its end. Finally, literary theory undermined the
critic's role as mediator between audience and text, treating the critic as merely another reader of the
text. Miller, Preface, in IDENTITY OF THE LITERARY TEXT, supra note 12, at ix.
53. See Culler, Introduction: The Identity of the Literary Text, in IDENTITY OF THE LITERARY
TEXT, supra note 12, at 3.
54. Miller, supra note 52, at x. Put differently, the reader "actualizes" the text, which comes
into existence only when the reader engages (reads, sees, operates) the textual artifact (e.g., book,
film, computer program). Textual identity turns on what the reader brings to the reading process,
and because readers differ in their cultural, linguistic, and rhetorical background, texts will differ
upon successive readings. For example, Hans Robert Jauss, one of the principals in a primarily
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not, as the New Critical model supposed, have a fixed identity.55 The
most radical theorists argue that the text has no identity at all, but in-
stead is in a constant state of flux.5"
Much post-structuralist criticism, moreover, emphasizes the inevita-
ble interrelationship-termed "intertextuality"-among all texts. Post-
structuralist thought posits that intertextuality arises out of both the
reading and the writing process. Texts do not exist independently of
someone reading them, and the text is never a separate "work," but is
always permeated by other texts that the reader brings to the process of
reading.57 Similarly, post-modernist thought asserts that the text does
not arise anew out of the mind of an author-genius, but instead is inevita-
bly a reproduction of other texts. Roland Barthes writes:
We now know that the text is not a line of words releasing a single
"theological" meaning (the "message" of an Author---God) but a
multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them
original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from
German movement termed "reception theory," maintains that "literature should be treated as a
dialectical process of production and reception." HOLUB, supra note 12, at 57 (discussing Jauss'
theories). See FISH, supra note 12. Alternatively, "reader-response critics would argue that a [text]
cannot otherwise be understood apart from its results." Tompkins, supra note 47, at ix. The effect of
that criticism is to destroy the objectivity of the text, in that way reorganizing the distinctions be-
tween text and reader. Id. at x.
55. Tompkins, supra note 16, at x.
56. For example:
The deconstruction position is of course derived from Jacques Derrida's theory of
polysemy in which he maintains that the semantic operation we call deconstruction is a
continuous mode of play with the text by the reader, and its major aim is to destroy the
illusory notion of a fixed textual meaning. Every meaning which is presumed to stand by
the commentator is shown to be no more than a play between simulation and dissimula-
tion. The true nature of every text therefore is to be in a state of flux as long as it is
engaged by the reader and is reduced to a mere trace when the engagement is over because
the text has no determinate essence.
Mario Valdes, Conclusion, in IDENTITY OF THE LrTERARY TEXT, supra note 12, at 310 n.10.
Alternatively, it has been argued that a reader's strategies of reading proceed from the "inter-
pretive community" of which he or she is a member. FISH, supra note 12, at 14. "Interpretive
communities are made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading but for writing
texts, for constituting their properties." Id. The explanation for the stability of interpretation
among different readers is that they belong to the same interpretive community; the reason why a
single reader employs different interpretive strategies and "makes" different texts is that he or she
belongs to different communities. Id at 14-15, 171. "Utterers" (i.e, authors and speakers) give the
hearers and readers the opportunity to make meanings (and texts) by inviting them to put into
execution a set of strategies. Id at 173. Even the so-called formal aspects of text are a product of
these strategies, because formal patterns are themselves constituted by the interpretive act, which,
for example, invests line endings in a poem with importance. Id. at 13, 173. Interpretive communi-
ties, meanwhile, are no more stable than texts. A person cannot know whether he or she is a mem-
ber of an interpretive community, since to decide that issue is itself an act of interpretation.
57. Owen Miller, Intertextual Identity, in IDENTrIY OF THE LITERARY TEXT, supra note 12, at
19. See Harold Bloom, in Plagiarism-A Symposium, N.Y. TIMES LrrERARY Supp., Apr. 9, 1982 at
413 [hereinafter Plagiarism-A Symposium].
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innumerable centers of culture. 53
This notion of "intertextuality" therefore squarely challenges the idea of
the autonomous work that is the product of authorial originality-an
idea central to the current system of copyright.
F. Textual Identity Reformulated
By its blurring of boundaries between "works," its rejection of
"originality" and "author" as meaningful concepts, and its preoccupa-
tion with how readers interact with texts, post-modernist literary theory
poses a considerable challenge to the doctrinal underpinnings of copy-
right law, which depends on the ability of a judge or jury to analyze and
compare literary "works" that have, more or less, a stable identity. Prin-
ciples of contemporary literary theory necessarily bear on copyright law
if for no other reason than that contemporary literary critics have them-
selves challenged the very logic of a system of copyright. Noting the
tension between literary criticism and copyright, Mark Rose writes:
"What current literary thought emphasizes is that texts permeate and
enable each other, and from this point of view the notion of distinct
boundaries between texts, a notion crucial to the operation of the modem
system of literary property, becomes difficult to sustain." 59
1. The Viability of Copyright in Light of Post-Structuralism
Such a direct challenge to an ingrained system of regulation could
generate several responses from those interested in copyright law. First,
copyright scholars could ignore the literary critics. This approach is un-
satisfactory because, as mentioned, the literary critics themselves have
questioned the copyright scheme and because, as I discuss in the next
sections of this Article, many of the insights of current literary thought
might in fact prove useful for copyright. A second response to the most
radical literary critics is to accept their challenge to the copyright system
uncritically and to abandon the system altogether, on the ground that
notions of authorship, originality, and similarity are not meaningful and
therefore result in arbitrary legal decisions. Without going into detail, I
believe that this radical approach is unsound both theoretically and prac-
tically. Thus, this Article explores a third response to the challenge of
current literary thought, namely that copyright could do well to assimi-
late certain insights of contemporary criticism. In this regard, the ques-
58. RoLAND BARTHES, IMAGE, Music, TEXT 146 (1967), quoted in CULLER, supra note 12, at
32-33.
59. Rose, Author as Proprietor, supra note 13, at 78.
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tion for both modem literary criticism and as discussed below, for
copyright becomes "whether it is feasible any longer to conceive of the
text as a distinct entity, marked by constituent features and viewed in
terms of some sort of analogy with personal identity, which itself to
many, appears to be a dubious concept." 6°
2. The Text in Copyright as an Event of Speech
Literary criticism itself can begin to provide answers to the question
whether a text has a sufficient "identity" to permit meaningful adjudica-
tion in a copyright infringement action. Many literary theorists who
have assimilated post-structuralist thought have nevertheless sought to
preserve the idea of textual identity by characterizing it in a way that
accounts for the variables in the reading process. In seeking to locate
textual identity, "two central questions emerge.... (a) What remains the
same in the literary text under conditions such as different readings? (b)
What is the text's distinctive unifying force?" 61 Though the text is not a
fixed artifact with a determinate meaning, the concept of textual identity
has been reformulated as a relational rather than as a constitutive no-
tion:62 "The belief that textual identity is not an a priori given but a
process worked out in the act of reading would seem to be a position
likely to command fairly widespread acceptance in today's intellectual
and cultural climate." 63 Textual identity has been
"broadly . . . defined as a function of the involvement of the text in
historical situations and communicative relationship.... [Tihe trajec-
tory from text to work involves the actualization of the inscribed dis-
course and its subtext. If the identity of the literary text is to be found
anywhere, it will have to be contracted (and would simultaneously be
distracted) at the intersection of these two different operations. The
intersection is the point in history where the linguistic study of the
inscribed systems of signs and discourse and the critical understanding
of their actualized significance for a moment engage in a reciprocal
relationship. 64
Textual identity depends on a congruence of reader and linguistic sign in
a particular context. The text is a speech event involving interaction
among a producer (the "author"), a textual artifact (book, movie, song,
computer program), and a recipient (reader, viewer, listener). Texts oc-
60. Mler, supra note 52, at ix.
61. Id,
62. 1, at xix.
63. Id
64. Robert Weimann, Textual Identity and Relationship, in IDENTITY OF THE LITERARY
TExT, supra note 12, at 289.
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cur only upon the dynamic interaction of all three.65
Thus, despite potential objections from radical post-structuralists,
because the text has identity as a speech event, the law of copyright can
remain a meaningful system, while at the same time assimilating many of
the insights of post-modernist thought. As Umberto Eco notes, "some-
thing can be truly asserted within a given universe of discourse and under
a given description, but this assertion does not exhaust all the other, and
potentially infinite, determinations of that object." 66 Put differently,
groups of individuals may share "a manifest cognitive environment." 67
A particular performance of a text--during a popular music concert, or
while reading a novel, or in a lawsuit--can therefore have a textual iden-
tity in a particular context, if identity is defined as a general agreement
about what a text probably means. 68 Returning to the example of Simon
& Garfunkle discussed earlier, observers can possibly agree on why many
audience members would react the same way to a performance of a text.
An infringement action is a universe of discourse in which it is possible as
a practical matter to reach agreement on the identity of the text such that
copyright law can meaningfully adjudicate.
So, though the text is not stable and autonomous, neither is it, for
copyright law, boundless. While recent literary thought teaches that the
text has no fixed identity, it also permits an approach to copyright law
that seeks to determine what is consistent about the text in a certain
context. Such a shift in focus can be useful in copyright analysis.
Significantly, however, any attempt to formulate a pragmatic defini-
tion of the text in copyright must start from the premise that texts have
the determinacy of an activity rather than of a physical object.69 Textual
interpretation entails probability and guesswork "predicated on practical
knowledge of language, conventions, and the situations in which they
operate."' 70 A text is bounded by, among other things, historical and
generic context.71 Generic conventions "organize most other constitu-
ents"72 of a text. Analysis of codes and context-including generic con-
65. FISH, supra note 12, at 43-44.
66. Eco, supra note 12, at 37. Or in the jargon of Stanley Fish's reader-response criticism, a
text may have identity within a particular interpretive community.
67. Alastair Fowler, The Future of Genre Theory: Functions and Constructional Types, in FU-
TURE LITERARY THEORY 291 (R. Cohen ed., 1989); see also Gerald Graif; Keep Off the Grass, in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 12, at 177.
68. Even theorists who treat the text as boundless acknowledge that certain interpretations are
more probable than others. See CULLER, supra note 12, at 135.
69. Graff, supra note 67, at 177.
70. Id. at 179.
71. ALASTAIR FOWLER, KINDS OF LrTERATURE 258-59 (1982).
72. Id.
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text-permits at least some range of determinacy of meaning (here
defined as the ability of judges or juries to agree on what a text probably
means). 73
In summary, current literary thought treats the text as an act of
speech. In this regard, contemporary literary criticism poses three cen-
tral questions for copyright. A first question is whether copyright law in
fact conceives of the text differently from the way contemporary criticism
does. This Article demonstrates below that, rather than assimilating the
concept of dynamic, context-sensitive "text," copyright has generally em-
braced the New Critical idea of the "work" as an object with fixed char-
acteristics existing independently of context and audience. According to
this concept, the "work's" characteristics can be discovered through an
act of interpretation that reveals the work's essential meaning. A sec-
ond question is whether there is anything wrong with copyright's assimi-
73. Id at 262. This approach to the text finds an analogue in areas of the law governing litera-
ture. First Amendment cases, for example, squarely focus on how a particular audience will engage
a text in a given context.
The very notion of speech is, of course, incomprehensible outside a cultural and social
context Thus, activities thought to be speech-related need not be so in every setting ....
[A]ctivities not ordinarily thought to have any particular expressive dimension--such as
sleeping or camping outdoors-might properly acquire such a dimension in a specific regu-
latory context .... When the acts that trigger a rule's enactment and that occasion its
invocation in the case at hand are both intended to express, and understood by their audi-
ence to express, a particular message, it is necessary to subject the rule and its enforcement
to some degree of first amendment scrutiny.
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrrrIoNAL LAW 831 (2d ed. 1988). See Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (considering context in deciding whether flag burning is expressive);
Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). So
speech (i.e., text) is an activity that can be defined and regulated only after considering the interac-
tion of the utterer, the textual artifact, and the audience. For example, the common example sug-
gests that a person yells "fire" in a particular context. The effect on the audience-and the law's
decision how to regulate (or "protect") the text-will vary depending on whether the speaker is a
spectator in a crowded theater, a captain in command of a firing squad, a personnel director, or a
rock and roll singer in concert. The law can regulate such speech, but only if context is examined.
Defamation law also regards the text as a reader-dependent process. The "verbal formulas"
used to define defamation are recipient-oriented, looking at the effect of the communication on those
who receive it. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, § 4.02[l], at 4-4.1 (1991). In wres-
tling with how the reader engages the text, defamation law first tries to identify the codes and con-
ventions at work and then seeks to learn how the audience will behave upon interaction with the
text. Significantly, this inquiry requires identification of an audience, itself an act of interpretation
that can affect the ultimate "identity" of the text. For example, a determination whether a particular
text is hyperbole depends on conventions that the text's audience understands and invokes in engag-
ing the text. The courts will first look at aspects of the text that may send certain "signals" to the
reader. Thus, particular cautionary words, or editorials, cartoons, letters to the editor, and reviews
are encoded messages that alert a reader that what is asserted in the text is not to be taken as fact
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 33 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Defamatory
speech-which causes damage to an individual's reputation-is a product of cultural convention,
which can undergo profound change over time. SMOLLA, supra, § 4.03[5], at 4-9 (citations omitted).
As an example, Smolla notes that, before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). some
courts held it defamatory for a white person to be described as black, whereas today such a holding
would be unconscionable.
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lating the New Critical vision of the "work" rather than more recent
theories of the "text." The question here is whether copyright's notion of
the "work" furthers, or rather impedes, the objectives of copyright. The
answer is not inevitable: that the concept of the autonomous "work" no
longer has validity for literary critics does not mean that it is not useful
for copyright. Nevertheless, it is the thesis of this Article that copy-
right's assimilation of a New Critical approach to the "work" as a self-
contained, autonomous object has engendered serious problems in resolv-
ing the central issues relating to entitlement to and scope of protection,
substantial similarity, and fair use.
These problems lead to the third question that contemporary liter-
ary criticism poses, namely, whether copyright's central concepts can be
reformulated in a more useful way that takes into account the dynamic
nature of the text as a process of speech. As discussed below, recent
literary thought can provide a road map for such a reformulation, giving
due regard to the interests of the audience in the creation and dissemina-
tion of texts.
II. ENTITLEMENT TO COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
A. The Modernist "Work" as the Central Focus in Originality
Determinations
That copyright protects only the "original" elements of a work has
become, through repetition, an apparently simple and unremarkable
principle.74 The underlying rationale is that the law, in the public inter-
est, wants to encourage production of original material. 75 Moreover,
only "authors" are entitled to copyright protection, no matter how skill-
ful the copyist. 76 These apparently straightforward principles, however,
are conceptually troubling and have come under increasing scrutiny.77
The word "originality" conjures up the Romantic notion of autho-
rial genius, presumably setting a high standard for copyrightability.78 In
fact, originality in copyright differs markedly from Romantic originality.
The law has abandoned creative genius as the test of originality in favor
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1970); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT, § 2.01 (1992). In-
deed, this requirement has been called "the one pervading element prerequisite to copyright regard-
less of the form of the work." I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 2.01, at 2-6.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, § 2.1, at 61 (1989 & supp. 1992); see
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., II1 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
76. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 2.01[A], at 2-10.
77. Kg., Jaszi, supra note 8; Litman, supra note 12.
78. Eg., KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 23-25 (discussing Edward Young's 1759 essay Conjectures
on Original Composition, in CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 338).
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of the principle that a work is original if it merely owes it origin to the
author and, if derivative of other works (and not infringing of those other
works) shows more than a trivial variation from works that came before
it.79 In the next two subsections, I discuss the second aspect of the in-
quiry, relating to the amount of creativity necessary for copyrightability,
tracing briefly the evolution of the concept of "originality" in copyright
law, discussing how the current modernist approach to originality is
problematic, and proposing how assimilation of current literary thought
could provide useful insights to the issue regarding entitlement to protec-
tion. In the succeeding subsection, I discuss the concept of "independent
creation" as the basis for entitlement to protection.80
B. The Emergence of the "Work" as the Central Focus in Originality
Determinations
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony8 ' illustrates the evolution
of the notion of originality from a standard requiring a Romantic level of
originality to a standard that focuses merely on the existence of varia-
tions between works. In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court for the first
time held that copyright extended to photographs. In concluding that a
photographer was an "author," the Court stated: "The third finding of
fact says, in regard to the photograph in question, that it is a 'useful, new,
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff made
the [photograph]... entirely from his own original mental conception, to
which he gave visible form...' ",82 Based on this finding, the Court held
that the photograph was "an original work of art, the product of plain-
tiff's intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author. '8 3
On the one hand, Burrow-Giles reflects a decidedly Romantic ap-
proach to the text, focusing on whether an author, in effect, spawned a
work that was "entirely" his or her own. Originality, in this sense, em-
phasizes the work's position in the aesthetic hierarchy.84 So viewed, the
originality inquiry looks outside the work, making Romantic originality
the predicate of copyright protection.
79. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
80. See infra part II.E.
81. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
82. Id at 60.
83. Id.; see also Jaszi, supra note 8, at 480-81.
84. See also Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) ("It cannot, therefore, be held by any
reasonable argument that the protection of mere labels is within the purpose of the clause in ques-
tion. To be entitled to a copyright the article must have by itself some value as a composition, at
least to the extent of serving some purpose other than as a mere advertisement or designation of the
subject to which it is attached."); J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1897).
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On the other hand, Burrow-Giles contains the seeds of copyright's
later repudiation of author in favor of the self-contained work. This de-
rives from the Court's need to decide whether the photograph, a product
of a new technology, could receive copyright protection. The camera
seemed to be merely a mechanical device that, in effect, replaced the au-
thor as the mode by which the work came into being; at the same time,
the photograph seemed merely to depict the real, as opposed to the artis-
tic world.85 In short, technology appeared to distance the author from
his or her work. To overcome this apparent distancing of author from
the creative process, the- Court turned to the work to decide its own
worth, concluding-through observation of the work-that the photo-
graph at issue was "useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and grace-
ful." In other words, because characteristics in the work had aesthetic
worth, the Court could find that the author had exhibited the requisite
originality.
Twenty years later, as Romantic thought began to wane, "work"
increasingly emerged as the key determinant of entitlement to protection.
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,86 the Court confronted the
issue whether circus posters showed the requisite creativity to be copy-
rightable. Anticipating the New Criticism,8 7 the Court centered its in-
quiry on the characteristics of the posters themselves to determine their
entitlement to copyright protection.18 According to Bleistein, the pos-
ters' aesthetic value derived, not from a value judgment about authorial
genius, but strictly from a comparison with other works considered valu-
able.8 9 The poster in Bleistein was copyrightable because it was consid-
ered worthy as a self-contained "work," without regard to either the
work's relationship to a broader body of intertextual material or the ge-
nius of its authors. 90
85. 111 U.s. at 59.
86. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
87. See supra part I.D.
88. Peter Jaszi notes that the Court "focused primarily on the characteristics of the posters
themselves" in rendering its decision. Jaszi, supra note 8, at 483.
89. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.
90. The Court justified its finding of originality by noting the danger in having untrained law-
yers render decisions about art: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations ...." Id. at 251.
Implicitly, aesthetic evaluation-as the New Criticism held-requires training and should not be left
in the hands of the untutored. Nonetheless, Justice Holmes also articulated a somewhat Romantic
view of creativity, stating that "personality always contains something unique." Id at 250. Bleis-
tein, therefore, had not yet completely broken the Romantic mold. Because of this Romantic aspect,
some commentators characterize Bleistein as an example of copyright's embrace of Romantic
thought. Yet, rather than elevating the author, Bleistein downplays authorship, in the words of
Peter Jaszi, "effacing" and "generalizing" the concept. Jaszi, supra note 8, at 483.
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Justice Harlan's dissent in Bleistein provides an interesting counter-
point to the majority's focus on the self-contained work. In contrast to
the majority, Justice Harlan would have looked beyond the work in de-
termining its value. He asserted that the work must have "some connec-
tion with the fine arts to give it intrinsic value" and that advertisements
for a circus did not have this connection. 91 Criticizing the majority's
conception of the work as the arbiter of its own meaning (that is, as the
source of its own originality), Justice Harlan wrote: "No evidence, aside
from the deductions which are to be drawn from the prints themselves,
was offered to show that these designs had any original artistic quali-
ties."'92 For Justice Harlan, copyrightability was to be decided by factors
external to the work. To be sure, the extratextual material that the dis-
sent would consider derived from Romantic thought: Justice Harlan
would have found that the posters had no "intrinsic value" or "original
artistic qualities." Nevertheless, in taking this approach, the dissent
would look beyond the work to place the posters in a broader context as
texts.
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, In.,93 decided at the height
of the New Criticism, marks copyright's complete embrace of the notion
of the "work" in determinations of copyrightability, and its concomitant
repudiation of the Romantic notion of "author." The issue in Alfred Bell
& Co. was whether mezzotint engravings of paintings of the old masters
were entitled to copyright protection. In holding these engravings copy-
rightable, Judge Frank eliminated the Romantic idea of author from the
determination of originality. Now, "[n]o matter how poor artistically the
'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own."' 94 Originality does not
mean "startling, novel or unusual"; instead, it merely means that a work
"' 4owes its origin' to the 'author.' "5 Authorship means only "ordinary
skill and diligence,' '96 and requires only a "trivial variation. ' 97 Variation
is determined by setting up differences between works, no matter how
those differences arise:
[E]ven if [the mezzotint engravings'] substantial departures from the
[originals] were inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A copy-
ist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap
of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having
91. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. Id
93. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
94. Id at 103.
95. Id at 102.
96. Id
97. Id
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hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the "author" may adopt it as
his and copyright it.98
Like the New Criticism's author, the "author" for Judge Frank takes a
back seat to what is "in" the work. The work may have worth quite
independently of the author's volition and control. Indeed, rather than
creating the work, the author for Judge Frank in a sense becomes so after
the work comes into existence; the work may emerge even by accident, in
which case, the author becomes such when he or she, after the fact,
"adopts" the pre-existing work as his or her own.99
Viewed from this perspective, the level of creativity necessary to
support copyrightability has little to do with author and everything to do
with difference. A work of "authorship" is original if it is different from
other works, no matter how slight the difference and no matter how the
difference arises. For copyright, it is the attempt to draw boundaries be-
tween works that becomes important in deciding whether a work may
receive protection.
C. Inadequacies in the Concept of the "Work" in Cases Addressing
Entitlement to Protection
Copyright's New Critical notion of the "work" in originality deter-
minations certainly differs from the post-structuralist concept of the
fluid, dynamic "text." The question becomes, however, whether copy-
right's adoption of the New Critical model of the work results in ques-
tionable decisionmaking. Current confusion in the case law surrounding
the originality requirement suggests that it does.
John Wiley has written that it is anomalous to hinge the originality
determination on variations between works.10 0 Although he agrees with
the ultimate result, Wiley criticizes the seminal Alfred Bell & Co. on two
grounds.101 First, he notes that Judge Frank's conclusion that the plain-
tiff's mezzotint reproductions of the old masters did not intend to (and
did not in fact) imitate the paintings that they reproduced "can barely be
read with a straight face," especially given Judge Frank's use of the word
"reproduced." 10 2 Second, he describes it as "perverse" to hinge original-
ity determinations on variation, since in many cases of artistic reproduc-
tion-presumably, including that presented in Alfred Bell & Co.-
98. Id at 105 (footnotes omitted).
99. In recognizing that art can arise from accident, Alfred Bell & Co. -while elevating the work
to privileged status in copyright-anticipates the post-structuralist demystification of work and
author.
100. John S. Wiley Jr., Copyright At the School of Patent, 58 U. CM. L. REv. 119, 137 (1991).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 135.
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variation is a vice. 0 3
Copyright's assimilation of the notion of "work" facilitated, if not
caused, Judge Frank's emphasis on variation as the standard for original-
ity. According to modernist thought, "characteristic" art was more val-
uable than "imitative" art.0 4 For example, it was believed that true
artists trying to render the same landscape would always create some-
thing different.'05 If, as the New Criticism held, a work of art has an
essence and is analogous to architecture or a machine, 0 6 the most obvi-
ous way to demarcate between it and other works of art is to emphasize
perceived variations. Given his modernist model of the work, Judge
Frank had little choice but to predicate "originality" on the perceived
differences between works.
Judge Posner's oft-criticized opinion in Gracen v. Bradford Ex-
change 10 7 is a second example of how a court's use of the New Critical
construct of the "work" can foster problematic opinions. In Gracen, the
plaintiff entered a contest conceived by her employer to use preexisting
photographs of Judy Garland as Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz' 08 to
paint a picture of Dorothy. Gracen used the existing photographs to
paint a picture of Dorothy superimposed over an image of the yellow
brick road. Her paintings won the contest. The defendant initially called
plaintiff "a true prodigy" whose painting "conveyed the essence of Judy's
character in the film... the painting that left everybody saying, 'That's
Judy in Oz.' "19
Plaintiff later refused to permit defendant to use her paintings. Af-
ter commissioning a second artist to "clean up" plaintiff's paintings, de-
fendant sold them. Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant had infringed
her work. The defendant argued that Gracen's work was unoriginal, and
therefore not copyrightable, because it did not show sufficient variation
from the underlying MGM motion picture and photographs. The Sev-
enth Circuit agreed, refusing to grant copyright protection to "a picture
created by superimposing one copyrighted photographic image on an-
103. Id
104. See Cassirer, Art, in CRIrrICAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 996.
105. Id at 999. This preference for the work that was different from other works as against
imitative works had it roots in the Romantic concept of authorial genius. RosE, AUTos AND
OwNERs, supra note 13, at 197-99. Yet, works had value, not if they were merely different, but if
they were the product of an author-genius. With modernism's rejection of the notion of author-
genius, the only remaining basis on which a work could be evaluated was difference.
106. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
107. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
108. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (1939).
109. 698 F.2d at 301.
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other . . . ."1o
In justifying his decision, Judge Posner first drew a distinction be-
tween "artistic originality," on the one hand, and the "legal concept" of
originality under the Copyright Act, on the other.I' So-called "artistic
originality" is much like Romantic originality, going to the work's aes-
thetic qualities.' 7 Judge Posner pointed out that so-called "Super Real-
istic" and Northern European Renaissance paintings-no less than
Cubist or Abstract-Expressionist painting-have aesthetic originality,
even if they are indistinguishable from photographs.1 3 By virtue of this
reference to accepted realist art forms, Judge Posner clearly believed that
Gracen's paintings-which in a sense were super-realistic-had "artistic
originality." If so, the paintings could fairly have been held to satisfy
even a Romantic notion of originality.
But, according to Judge Posner, despite 'their artistic worth,
Gracen's paintings did not satisfy the test of what he called "legal origi-
nality." Legal originality supposedly exists to "assure a sufficiently gross
difference between the underlying and the derivative work to avoid en-
tangling subsequent artists depicting the underlying work in copyright
problems," 14 and in that way to prevent "overlapping claims" by several
artists who all produce derivative works based on an underlying
work.' 1 5 In articulating the distinction between artistic and legal origi-
nality, Gracen exhibited an ambivalence toward the issue of variation.
At times, Judge Posner seemed concerned that Gracen's work did not
vary from the underlying MGM material. At other times, he worried
that her paintings might be indistinguishable from some future works
also derived from the MGM motion picture or photographs. Regardless,
Judge Posner held that a work receives no copyright protection where
the lines between it and other works could become blurred. Again, copy-
right protection turns on "differences," that is, setting one work apart
from another.' 16
110. Id at 305.
111. Id. at 304.
112. "Artistic originality indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to be
apprehended by a judge." Id. Judge Posner referred to Super Realism and Northern European
Renaissance painting, calling them "in a sense--but not an aesthetic sense-less 'original' than Cub-
ism or Abstract Expressionism." Id. He continued that "a portrait is not unoriginal for being a
good likeness." Id It is interesting that Judge Posner's basis of comparison--Cubism and Abstract
Expressionism-are archetypal examples of modernist works.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
115. Id at 304.
116. Judge Posner distinguished between derivative works and paintings "from life", id at 305,
indicating that his test of originality applies only to derivative works. Peter Jaszi has treated this as a
manifestation of Gracen's inclination to apply a Romantic hierarchy in valuing art, prizing that
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Judge Posner's opinion assumes that the economic benefit that
would result from granting copyright protection to works like Gracen's
are outweighed by the costs that would result from entangling subse-
quent artists depicting the underlying work in copyright infringement
litigation.' 17 This conclusion has been criticized as unsound economic
analysis, as has Gracen's focus on the importance of variation as the
threshold of originality."i 8
Admittedly, it is easy to criticize Judge Posner's decision on tradi-
tional copyright grounds (arguably, Gracen's painting contained more
than a trivial variation from the original) and without analyzing the deci-
sion in terms of contemporary literary criticism. Nonetheless, at the very
least, copyright's notion of the "work" made it easier for the Gracen
court to err. For Judge Posner-as for Judge Frank in Alfred Bell &
Co.-the New Critical construct of "work" served as a structural tool
that fostered unsound reasoning, resulting in what many believe to be an
incorrect decision. As noted above, according to the New Critical con-
ception of "work," differences from other "works" are essential to pre-
serving a particular work's autonomy. Because Gracen's paintings did
not exhibit this autonomy vis-d-vis possible future derivative works-and
perhaps vis-d-vis the underlying photographs from the Wizard of Oz-it
was easier for Judge Posner to devalue Gracen's paintings as against the
perceived litigation costs that would result from protecting her paintings.
D. Entitlement to Protection and Contemporary Literary Theory
The question becomes whether an approach to the text more in
keeping with current literary thought could have avoided some of the
doctrinal problems of Alfred Bell & Co. and Gracen--or at least could
have refocused the inquiry. I suggest that it could. Under established
taken from imagination over application. Jaszi, supra note 8, at 462-63. However, the distinction is
merely another manifestation of Gracen's unwillingness to recognize the elusiveness of textual iden-
tity. Judge Posner assumed that "real life" differs from what is "in" an underlying "work." How-
ever, in the creative process, real life is no less an intertext than a classic "underlying work."
From a different perspective, Jaszi has criticized Gracen as an unfortunate return to the Roman-
tic notion of authorship-and thus as a retreat from the principles set forth in Alfred Bell & Co. In
this vein, Gracen has been called "a considerable departure from traditional copyright doctrine...
(that] cannot be adequately explained in terms of the nominal justification offered by Judge Posner,"
but that, instead, reassimilated the Romantic approach to authorship into the originality determina-
tion, privileging "art that results from true imagination rather than mere application." On the con-
trary, Gracen-far from embracing the Romantic notion of originality-once more repudiated that
notion as a means to perpetuate the illusion that the work is self-contained and autonomous.
117. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305; Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 356; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 108, 111 n.7 (1990); Wiley, supra
note 100, at 137.
118. Wiley, supra note 100, at 137.
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canon, the originality requirement exists to reward creativity and not
mere great skill, training, knowledge, or effort. The creativity standard,
however minimal, relates to something that is supposedly inherently val-
uable about the work as it relates to the broader discourse. 119 Recent
cases have focused on variation as the measure of that value. But varia-
tion among works is not all that matters in deciding a work's creative
worth. Rather, as Alastair Fowler has said, "to have any artistic signifi-
cance, to mean anything distinctive in a literary way, a work must modu-
late or vary or depart from its generic conventions, and consequently
alter them for the future." 12 0 An emphasis on variation or modulation of
convention, however, does not mean that a particular "work" must have
distinguishable variations from another "work." Fowler notes that "the
most imitative work, even as it kowtows slavishly to generic conventions,
nevertheless affects them, if only minutely or indirectly." 121 Indeed,
"two verbally identical texts can have completely different meanings
when they are framed differently." 122
By placing the text in its broader context, it is possible to provide a
another justification for the result in Alfred Bell & Co. and to reassess the
opinion in Gracen, both within the confines of the law's persistence in
requiring authorial "originality." I emphasize that this discussion does
not seek to dictate how copyright's approach to originality should be, but
rather how, in light of contemporary literary theory, the inquiry into
"originality" might be refocused to consider the policies underlying the
protection of copyrighted texts. Under such an alternative approach, the
term "originality" would not merely refer to differences between works,
but rather would focus on the extent to which a derivative work serves to
modulate or vary broader convention. In Alfred Bell & Co., before the
plaintiff created its engravings, the public had limited access to accurate
renditions of the original oil paintings. The originals could only be seen
by visitors to a museum, gallery, or other building (depending on where
the originals hung). The mezzotint copies broadened this access by more
faithfully rendering the original paintings.1 23 The plaintiff's texts there-
119. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 2.01[A] at 2-10; see Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Ser. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
120. FOWLER, supra note 71, at 23.
121. Id
122. Peter W. Nesselroth, Literary Identity and Contextual Difference, in IDENTITY OF THE
LITERARY TEXT, supra note 12, at 43. Nesselroth gives several literary examples of this. An oft-
cited fictional example of this phenomenon of "transcontextualization" is described in Jorge L.
Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in LABYRINTHs: SELECTED STORIES & OTHER
WRITINGS 36-44 (1964).
123. The plaintiff's reproductions preserved the softness of line characteristic of the original oil
paintings. 74 F. Supp. at 975, 979.
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fore permitted broader distribution to the public of textual artifacts con-
ventionally accepted as having high aesthetic quality and in that way
changed the cultural perception about the originals, which previously
had not been reproduced in the same way. This broader dissemination
undoubtedly altered the generic and aesthetic conventions surrounding
the originals. Moreover, in reaching audience members that perhaps pre-
viously had no access to the underlying works at all, the reproductions
differed from the underlying works because the audience saw them
within a distinct cultural and generic context. Viewed in terms of their
effect on broader cultural and generic convention, the mezzotints in Al-
fred Bell & Co. derived their "originality," not from being different from
the underlying paintings, but from being faithful reproductions.
The counter-argument to this view of originality is that any type of
reproduction-for example, a reproduction on a photocopy machine-
would be original, since the dissemination of such copies would vary the
generic and cultural conventions permeating the underlying text. The
response to this is that certain reproductions may have a de minimis ef-
fect on existing convention (for example, texts that have already been
massed-produced, like a best-selling novel). Moreover, even post-struc-
turalist critics recognize the existence of a speaker of the text, who is
more than just a person at a photocopy machine. 124 In this sense, post-
structuralist theory allows for differentiation between the producer of the
text and one who, for example, through research uncovers a previously
undiscovered text.
An approach to originality that had focused on how tle text modu-
lates or varies code and convention could also have shed additional light
on the deficiencies in Judge Posner's Gracen opinion. Importantly, by
their very nature, Gracen's paintings of Dorothy in Oz in and of them-
selves challenged the New Critical notion of the work. As a contestant,
Gracen had to reproduce a preexisting popular icon and to invoke a clear
intertextual connection between her paintings and theiunderlying work.
The defendant had instructed the contestants: "We do want your inter-
pretation of these images, but your interpretation must evoke all the
warm feeling the people have for the film and its actors. So, your Judy/
Dorothy must be very recognizable as everybody's Judy/Dorothy." 125
The outcome of the contest-and the resulting paintings-turned, not on
distinctions among works, but on the artist's ability to create a text en-
124. See Knapp & Michaels, "Against Theory," in AGAINST THEORY, supra note 12, at 16-17
(recognizing that the existence of an author-in the sense of an intentional agent-must necessarily
be inferred by the reader for the text to have meaning).
125. 698 F.2d at 301.
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tirely derivative of the preexisting works. As in Alfred Bell & Co., the
value of Gracen's paintings lay in how closely she could come to reas-
similating the original motion picture in her paintings.
Gracen succeeded in her objective, being described as a "true prod-
igy." This success, moreover, had a strong audience component: an au-
dience member could fully appreciate Gracen's paintings only if he or she
had pre-existing knowledge of the popular icon The Wizard of Oz. In-
deed, Gracen won the contest because her paintings were judged the clos-
est to "everybody's" Dorothy. The term "everybody" referred to the
broader culture, which has assimilated the MGM version of the Wizard
of Oz as its own, a fact underscored by the court's observation that
Gracen's paintings were adjudged the best by passersby in a shopping
center. By invoking an intertextual relationship with prior works,
Gracen's paintings asked the viewer to participate in the actualization of
(that is, the creation of) the text by bringing his or her own vision of the
Wizard of Oz (and the Dorothy character and Judy Garland) to the expe-
rience of the paintings.
In Gracen, therefore, the derivative work, no matter how much like
the underlying work, had "a different meaning" from the original be-
cause it was framed in a distinct context. 126 Moreover, the paintings ar-
guably served a useful cultural and social goal by permitting the audience
to participate in a new and fresh rearticulation of popular myths. If
"originality" in a post-structuralist world means modulation of existing
convention, Gracen's paintings were unquestionably original.
In any event, assessing originality in light of the effect on Gracen's
works on culture and convention necessarily changes the focus of Judge
Posner's economic analysis. If variation is copyright's benchmark of cre-
ativity, then it is at least arguable that Gracen's paintings were not origi-
nal. However, evaluating Gracen's paintings in light of their effect on the
broader culture through modulation of existing convention and audience
interaction with the text, they have an obvious social and cultural value.
While Judge Posner's approach to the work could, within the standards
of the New Criticism, disregard the audience's importance in "creating"
Gracen's paintings, current literary thought would necessarily argue that
the audience played a significant role in creating the paintings, a role that
gave rise to a benefit that might more obviously outweigh the costs of
litigating cases involving later artists who seek to copy the underlying
work. It may be that, for those who subscribe to Judge Posner's position,
the cost of litigation arising from protection of Gracen's painting would
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68:725
BEYOND METAPHOR
still outweigh the benefit of granting her protection. The point is that an
approach to the text more consistent with current literary thought would
have refocused the inquiry.1 27
Stretching the outer limits of a contemporary treatment of legal
"originality," hypothetically an identical reproduction of an earlier work
could under some circumstances be original. This is contrary to tradi-
tional approaches to originality. Nimmer writes:
[Ain artist who makes such an exact reproduction of a Rembrandt that
even the experts cannot distinguish it from the original, undoubtedly
exhibits great skill, training, knowledge and judgment, but in failing to
create a "distinguishable variation," he has not produced anything
which "owes its origin" to him, and hence has not engaged in an act of
authorship. 12 8
And yet, it is possible that this artist modulates convention and, indeed,
even articulates a different text because of changed context. Suppose, for
example, that an artist makes an exact reproduction of Rembrandt's
Night Watch. Suppose further that the artist exhibits the reproduction
with his own paintings of Campbell Soup cans and Marilyn Monroe. As-
sume that, although each painting is on a separate canvas and is framed
individually, they are all hung on a movable wall and treated by the artist
as a single, inseparable work. Finally, suppose that the painter is named
Andy Warhol. In this situation, the cultural significance of the repro-
duction and the concomitant modulation of cultural convention become
evident. Such a reproduction might easily result in a reassessment of
Warhol's work, thus altering conventional assessments of a well-known
artist, while at the same time changing cultural views about Rembrandt's
127. A literary critical approach to the "work" might also better justify decisions withholding
copyright protection for lack of originality. In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976), the Second Circuit refused to find that plastic reproductions
of public domain cast iron banks depicting Uncle Sam were original. In so holding, the court in-
creased the standard of originality annunciated Alfred Bell & Co., requiring a "substantial variation,
not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a different medium." Id. at
491. To reach a result that seems proper, the court increased the quantum of originality necessary
to obtain protection, further privileging works that show variation over works that seek to be faithful
reproductions.
However, if Batlin had focused on the way in which the text modulates or varies convention in
deciding originality, it would not have been difficult to conclude that the plaintiff's works were not
original. The underlying works-cast iron banks-had already been mass-produced for some time.
Given the maturity of the genre, dissemination of plastic versions of the banks would probably have
had only a slight impact on existing generic convention. "[Ilt may be that frequent imitation can use
up formal possibilities, to the point that a kind no longer offers sufficient fresh variety to promise
excellence." FOWLER, supra note 71, at 165. The genre in Bailin seems to fit that description. For
this reason, even under a post-modernist model of the text, it could be argued the works at issue
there were not "original." See also Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d
Cir. 1980).
128. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, at § 2.02[A] at 2-10 (citing Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
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work, particularly if the hypothetical reproduction of the Rembrandt
were considered pastiche, or even, by virtue of its being placed in a pop
art exhibit, parody.1 29 It is difficult to justify on creative grounds with-
holding copyright protection from the Warhol reproduction of the
Rembrandt.
One could respond that the exhibit is a single work that contains
variations from Rembrandt's original Night Watch, thus making the en-
tire work original. Yet such an approach would strain the notion of a
"work" that contains trivial variations, unless the notion of autonomous
work is to be abandoned. The point is that copyright's current approach
to originality is rather arbitrary, withholding protection from much that
has cultural worth. Admittedly, it may be impossible-as well as unde-
sirable for overriding policy reasons relating to burden of proofP3 0-for
an artist who makes the exact reproduction of the Rembrandt to prove
infringement of the distinctive elements of his or her work (that is, by
virtue of the unique context in which the copy is portrayed, it is virtually
inconceivable that one could copy the way in which the Warhol repro-
duction alters the culture's view of Rembrandt or of Warhol's own
work).131 But the example shows how a text can have artistic value-
and effect cultural change-even if it does not, under a New Critical view
of the "work," vary at all from prior works.
I stress again that the above examples of how "originality" could be
approached from the perspective of contemporary literary criticism are
not necessarily suggestions about how copyright should be, but are
merely examples of how it might be. The essential point is that the cur-
rent originality requirement, with its New Critical focus on variation (de-
rived from the modernist notion of "work"), as the sole determinant of
protection is arbitrary, since variation may be only one indicium of dis-
tinctiveness in a text. While, as a matter of policy (problems of proof,
economics) it might very well be that the amount of variation between
texts should continue to be the sole determinant of originality, the courts
and commentators have not focused on the policies that would privilege
"variation" over other forms of generic modulation. This discussion thus
invites a reassessment of the originality requirement that would consider
129. See Harris, supra note 12 (describing how parody alters convention); FOWLER, supra note
71, at 188-90 (discussing how satire, including parodic satire, modulates genre).
130. In other words, Judge Posner's policy arguments in Gracen may have more weight in a case
like this, since the costs of litigation might indeed outweigh the benefits of such an exact
reproduction.
131. That is, only the distinctive elements of such a work would be protected by copyright, and
it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which those distinctive elements could be infringed by an
exact reproduction rendered by someone other than Warhol.
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whether, in light of underlying policy considerations (problems of proof,
economic issues) the creative value of a text arises out of its relationship
to a broader social, cultural, and literary context and not merely from
perceived variations from prior works. 132 In short, originality analysis
could stand reevaluation because variation from earlier texts is not the
only thing that makes a text worthwhile.
E. Independent Creation and Post-Modernist Thought
A possible response to the argument that the cases place undue em-
phasis on variation, and by extension on the "work," as a benchmark of
originality is that the law will protect exact reproductions so long as the
author has not copied from another. In other words, a plaintiff's text is
original if it was created independently of prior texts, even if identical to
a prior text.133 Hypothetically, the doctrine of independent creation
would protect exact renditions of a preexisting text, therefore permitting
copyright protection for rearticulation of texts (like Warhol's fictional
Night Watch, if Warhol had painted the reproduction without referring
to Rembrandt's painting) that have cultural value, while at the same time
depriving rank copyists of protection.
There are two problems with the notion of "independent creation."
First, approaching the text from the perspective of the audience, it is
difficult to see how a reproduction of a Rembrandt that was painted
while the artist stood before the original has less cultural significance
than an identical painting that was created by an artist who never saw
132. One such policy consideration deserves mention, however. Paradoxically, by fostering deci-
sions that withhold copyright protection, the New Critical construct of the work arguably discour-
ages the dissemination of speech. Often, texts that are most familiar and valuable to a mass culture
receive no protection by virtue of their familiarity. For example, Gracen's rendition of The Wizard
of Oz sought to exploit modem icons and to involve the audience in the creative process. By refusing
to acknowledge the worth of such texts, copyright fails to encourage authors to exploit some of its
most important popular myths, therefore depriving the culture of important tools of discourse. Cf
Harris, supra note 12 (discussing how the Superman character is a modem myth that, by virtue of
the copyright laws, is nonetheless not available for exploitation by the culture).
133. Id See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, § 2.2.1. Put differently: "[Tihe originality necessary
to support a copyright merely calls for independent creation, not novelty .... Originality means
only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently created, and not copied from
other works." 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 2.01[A], at 2-9. The originality requirement
thus folds into the defense of independent creation. "The subjects of copyrightability and infringe-
ment ... are close, almost Siamese, partners." KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 38. However:
The two tests [for originality and copyright infringement] differ in important respects. Par-
aphrases of earlier works that would suffice for originality will often not suffice to avoid
infringement. The addition of a new element to a prior work, though it will support origi-
nality, will not excuse infringement if the prior work is a copyrighted work. Further, the
audience test, which plays an important role in infringement determinations, plays no role
in originality determinations.
1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, § 2.2.1 at 63 n.6.
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Rembrandt's version. Indeed, the audience may assimilate the reproduc-
tions in the same way, or in different ways, each of which is nevertheless
important to the culture. The concept of independent creation focuses
on the author's conduct, rather than on audience response, in a way that
makes little sense in light of contemporary literary thought.
More fundamentally, independent creation is a practical impossibil-
ity. Northrop Frye writes:
It is hardly possible to accept a critical view which confuses the origi-
nal with the aboriginal, and imagines that a "creative" poet sits with a
pencil and some blank paper and eventually produces a new poem in a
special act of creation ex nihilo. Human beings do not create in that
way. Just as a new scientific discovery manifests something that was
already latent in the order of nature, and at the same time is logically
related to the total structure of the existing science, so the new poem
manifests something that was already latent in the order of words ....
Poetry can only be made out of other poems; novels out of other
novels. 1 34
Others have made similar points. 135 It is not surprising that some have
charged that the originality requirement stifles the, creation of texts. 136
The requirement of independent creation does not overcome the
134. NORTHRUP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 97 (1957).
135. See Bloom, supra note 57, at 413:
The more deeply and widely we read, the more we become aware that good poems, novels,
and essays are webs of allusion, sometimes consciously and voluntarily so, but perhaps to a
greater degree without design. This unknowing allusiveness, carried far enough, can be-
come quotation, and no writer ever can be certain precisely when he is quoting.
According to Jessica Litman, all creative works include elements adapted from "raw materials"
that the author first encountered in another text. Litman, supra note 12, at 1010-11; see Goldstein,
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 209, 218
(1983); Peter Jaszi, When Works Collide" Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the
Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REv. 715, 729-33 (1981). Litman notes that no one has the capacity to
ascertain the source of individuals' inspirations. Litman, supra note 12, at 975. She characterizes
the creative process as a combination of "absorption," "astigmatism," and "amnesia," stating that
authorship is a process of transformation, some of which is purposeful, some of which is inadvertent,
and some of which is the product of the author's "peculiar astigmatic vision." Id at 1010, 1011.
She concludes that the'idea of the public domain serves to ameliorate the harm that could come from
taking the construct of originality too seriously. Indeed, it is even difficult to distinguish articulation
of facts (deemed unoriginal) from articulation of material deemed original: "Researchers can thus
be said to be composing their facts as they go along. In this sense, facts are no more 'out there' than
are plots, words, or sculptural forms." Id. at 996-97; see also Jane Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Recon-
structing History: A Comment on the Scope of Protection in Works of History After Hoeling v. Uni-
versal City Studios, 29 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 647, 658 (1982).
136. FRYE, supra note 134, at 96-97; Harris, supra note 12, at 266-67; THOMAS MCFARLAND,
ORIGINALITY & IMAGINATION 22-29 (1985). For example, according to Neil Harris, modem
mythic heroes (Superman being the archetype)-central to the culture-have become private prop-
erty that can only be used if parodied (permitted as a fair use). Harris states: "A self-referencing
system of myths which relies upon parodied imitation as one of its central instruments of integration
is a product of something beyond creative intention or legal history. And its social implications
must be faced both by the courts and by its consumers." Harris, supra note 12, at 267. In this view,
copyright deprives society full use of some of its most basic and important cultural communication.
See Litman, supra note 12.
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problems inherent in a work-based concept of originality, therefore, be-
cause all texts will necessarily reproduce other texts. Independent crea-
tion really means only that copyright tolerates some forms of
rearticulation of previous texts, while penalizing other forms. Specifi-
cally, the law forbids those acts of textual duplication that are perceived
to rely on an unduly narrow range of prior texts.
Returning to the example of Rembrandt's Night Watch, suppose a
first artist painted an exact reproduction while standing before Rem-
brandt's painting. Now, suppose that an exact reproduction were
painted by an artist who undertook an exhaustive study of Rembrandt's
technique; who steeped herself in biographical accounts of Rembrandt's
life; who studied most of Rembrandt's work; who read detailed verbal
descriptions of Night Watch; but who had never seen Rembrandt's ver-
sion. Copyright would find the latter artist's reproduction original, but
not the former's. Yet both artists relied on preexisting texts to create
their respective reproductions, and neither independently created his or
her painting, in the sense of creation on a clean slate. The independent
creation requirement seems an arbitrary way of distinguishing between
the two reproductions.
The concept of independent creation serves to legitimize a system
that values a text that draws on a broad range of anonymous textual
material over a text that draws only on identifiable sources-even where
the degree of skill and effort of the respective authors is equivalent.137
This may or may not be desirable social policy. 138 (Undoubtedly, the
137. In The Public Domain, Jessica Litman argues that the public domain exists to ameliorate
the pressures caused by the problematic concept of originality. Litman, supra note 12, 1015. Litman
apparently views the public domain as a way of fostering textual production that a strict application
of the illusory Romantic concept of originality would prevent. Id at 1012. However, Litman places
too much emphasis on the Romantic approach to originality as a governing concept. As noted
earlier, copyright has in fact banished the author and originality as the central animating concepts.
See supra part II.B. What Litman calls the public domain really comprises those elements-suppos-
edly contained in the autonomous work-that are unworthy of copyright protection. The work itself
supposedly sets the boundaries of copyright protection, primarily through the idea/expression di-
chotomy. Indeed, the recent tendency to speak of "protectibility" rather than of "public domain"-
a tendency that Litman astutely describes, id. at 995-is symptomatic of this privileging of the work
over the author. While the "public domain" semantically emphasizes what an author may use that
exists outside the work, "protectibility" focuses on elements supposedly in the objective work.
138. In pre-Romantic periods, a second work (in effect, a derivative work) was not considered
plagiarism if it added something of value to the earlier work. KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 17. So one
need not necessarily conclude that such a work has less aesthetic value. Indeed, Harold Bloom has
conceived of a system that values the dissemination of worthwhile textual material, even though the
person doing the disseminating "copies":
[O]nly one moral attitude toward plagiarism is possible in a literary context. This is that
only great writers should be plagiarized. To copy second-rate authors indeed is im-
moral .... The literary question in regard to supposed plagiarism therefore should always
be: what is the quality of the stolen material? If it is commonplace or worse, then we
ought to disapprove, and perhaps a copyright holder might contemplate legal action. But
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requirement deprives new producers of texts of the ability to use some of
society's most important icons.) 139 However, the point here is that the
illusion of "independent creation," which depends on a modernist notion
of autonomous "work," does not permit a full exposition of the policies
implicated in a decision to protect one "work" but not another.
III. THE "WORK" AND THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The construct of autonomous "work" also plays a critical role in
determinations of scope of copyright protection, that is, how far copy-
right protection extends to a particular plaintiff's product. Here, also,
the concept of work obfuscates rather than enlightens. In this section,
the Article discusses how the notion of "work" in fact underlies the in-
quiry into scope of protection, how the concept permits courts, con-
sciously or subconsciously, to manipulate results and obscure policy
decisions, and how the issue of scope of protection could more usefully
be considered in light of recent literary thought.
A. The "'Idea/Expression Dichotomy" as a Manifestation of the
Modernist Image of the "Work"
The "idea/expression" distinction supposedly establishes the param-
eters of the work's entitlement to copyright protection. A work's "ex-
pression" of an idea is protected; the idea itself is not.'14 So a producer
of a second text may refer to an earlier text and permissibly "take" the
idea from that earlier text, so long as he or she does not take the expres-
sion. 141 This distinction supposedly strikes a balance between the inter-
ests of copyright in encouraging production and dissemination of textual
material and the competing interest of avoiding monopolies that would
inhibit textual production. 142
There have been many attempts in the cases and commentary to
describe and apply the idea/expression distinction. The courts and com-
mentators repeatedly state that the distinction is difficult to apply in
practice. Judge Learned Hand distinguished between the abstract and
if the original is of real power and beauty, then our reaction ought not to be either immoral
or legal. By calling the original again to our attention, the copyist, however unwittingly,
has performed a critical function for us.
Bloom, supra note 57, at 413.
139. See Harris, supra note 12.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, § 2.3. The distinction arose early
in American law. See Daly v. Palmer, 6 Fed. Cas. 1132, No. 3552 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1868).
141. See, eg., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
142. See, eg., 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, § 2.3.
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the concrete. 143 Professor Chafee identified the "pattern" of the work as
its expression, defined in a work of fiction as the "sequence of events and
the interplay of characters." 144 Paul Goldstein describes ideas as con-
cepts, solutions, or building blocks. 145
Despite these attempts to define "idea" and "expression," scholars
generally agree that the distinction is elusive. The dichotomy has been
called ad hoc, 146 mythological, 147 and false.148 Commentators recognize
that an idea cannot be defined without expressing it, thus making the
dichotomy illusory.149 Others have questioned the value of the distinc-
tion for deciding the scope of protection in nonverbal media: while the
courts have held that the idea/expression distinction applies to musical
texts 50 and to computer software,151 commentators have despaired of
identifying an "idea" in these forms. 152
The idea/expression distinction, as much as any concept in copy-
right law, embodies the modernist view of the "work" as capable of gen-
erating a fixed interpretation independent of context. This approach to
the work in idea/expression inquiry underlies Judge Hand's seminal de-
scription of the distinction:
Upon any work and especially upon a play a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
143. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
144. Zechariah Chafee Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 503, 513
(1945).
145. 1 GOLDSTE7N, supra note 75, § 2.3.1.1.
146. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). At-
tempts at expressing the test tend to be circular or vague. For example, Nimmer suggests that the
line should be drawn at a place that "is in some degree abstract (omitting dialogue, minor incidents,
possibly setting, etc.) but is nevertheless sufficiently concrete so as to contain an expression of the
sequence of events and the interplay of the major characters." 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74,
§ 13.03[A], at 13-28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In defining the line between idea and
expression by using the word expression, Nimmer fails to explain the dichotomy. Neither are the
terms "abstract" and "concrete" self-explanatory.
147. Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 10 PACE
L. REV. 551 (1990).
148. Wiley, supra note 100, at 122-23.
149. Id.; Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 12, at 1023-24 & n.56.
150. Eg., Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423-24 (9th Cir. 1987).
151. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass. 1990).
152. Aaron Keyt, Comment, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL.
L. REv. 421, 443 (1988). ("In music there is no 'idea' or 'expression' to be distinguished."); Halvey,
Comment, supra note 12, at 743 ("It is in drawing the distinction between the computer program-
mer's idea and his expression of that idea that the application of conventional copyright principles
becomes difficult."). Perhaps the idea/expression dichotomy seems to work better in connection
with literary and dramatic works because the courts have had long experience in considering them,
and can, consistently with legal and cultural expectation, more easily decide what is protected and
what is not-i.e., which paraphrases are acceptable and which are not. This arises, however, not
because the idea/expression concept adequately describes the constitutive aspects of literary texts,
but because the courts are intuitively more aware of what constitutes unprotected convention in such
works.
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incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the general
statement of what the play is about and at times consist of only its title,
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use
of his ideas to which apart from their expression his property is never
extended. 153
In Judge Hand's view, so-called "expression" receives protection because
it is, for copyright, the essence of the text. Abstractions of this essence
"fit" on the "work," in patterns, but are not the "true work." Certain
abstract descriptions of this "work" ultimately become "idea" and re-
ceive no protection. But the true work exists independently of attempts
to characterize it, and the idea/expression distinction depends on inter-
pretation of the work.154
The idea/expression distinction reflects the tendency in New Criti-
cal thought to treat the work as if it had a fixed, ascertainable meaning,
separate from words that a reader uses to describe it.155 In words remi-
niscent of Judge Hand's formulation of the idea/expression distinction,
Cleanth Brooks wrote:
The dimension in which the poem moves.., includes ideas, to be sure;
we can always abstract an "idea" from a poem-even from the sim-
plest poem .... But the idea which we abstract-assuming that we
can all agree on what that idea is--will always be abstracted: it will
always be the projection of a plane along a line or the projection of a
cone upon a plane. 156
In other words, statements of the "work's" ideas should not be mistaken
for the "inner core" of the work. 157 Similarly, in copyright, paraphrase
(abstraction) that strays too far from the work's essence becomes unwor-
thy of copyright protection and is termed an unprotected idea.
B. Idea/Expression and the Fallacy of the "Work"
The New Critical concept of "work" in idea/expression analysis
leads to an interpretive methodology that increases the likelihood of un-
153. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (1930) (L. Hand, J.).
154. Ironically, for copyright the essence of the work lies, not at some deep core, but at the
surface of the work, i.e., the words on the page. Abstract characterizations of the work, though
some may still qualify for protection as "expression," move further and further away from this
surface.
155. BRools, supra note 46, at 192.
156. Id. at 205.
157. Id. at 206. Brooks continues:
We may, it is true, be able to adumbrate what the poem says if we allow ourselves enough
words, and if we make enough reservations and qualifications, thus attempting to come
nearer and nearer to the meaning of the poem by successive approximations and refine-
ments, gradually encompassing the meaning and pointing to the area in which it lies rather
than realizing it.
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satisfactory decisions. Recall that, for the New Critics, the meaning of
the text lay within the four corners of its pages, to be discovered through
interpretation of the work independent of context.15 8 More generally,
modernism treated the work of art as having an internal logic.159 The
objection to the New Criticism is that a text does not have only one fixed
meaning, but rather that a text's meaning changes depending on the con-
text in which the audience reads it. Yet cases exploring idea and expres-
sion continue to assume that the text is susceptible to a valid
interpretation, independent of context. For example, John Wiley has de-
scribed how the elements that Judge Hand described in Nichols as merely
similarities in idea could just as easily have been categorized as similarity
of expression.160 He notes that the description of what Universal copied
in Nichols as "the comical story of the conflict between a New York Jew-
ish family and an Irish Catholic family in which the children fall in love,
their fathers oppose their marriage plans on cultural and religious
grounds, the kids get married secretly, the fathers become furious" is
both an idea that can be further elaborated upon and an expression ("a
meaningful communication comprised of fixed symbols"). 161 Con-
versely, the script of Nichols' play was both expression and an idea that
could be further elaborated upon. Wiley concludes that, while Judge
Hand chose to call the plot "idea" and the script of the play "expres-
sion," he could have switched the assignments.1 62
Judge Hand obviously engaged in an act of interpretation of the
works at issue in Nichols, reaching a conclusion about the works that
was, by reason of the above analysis, not the only plausible interpreta-
tion. Yet Judge Hand could treat his interpretation of the works in Nich-
ols as the legitimate one because he adopted a modernist notion of the
"work" as having a "true" interpretation and a logical structure. The
concept of "work" in this way facilitates an unsatisfactory approach to
determining the scope of copyright protection.
The uncertainty of interpretation is evident in other attempts at dis-
tinguishing idea from expression based on a New Critical model of the
work. To take a textbook example, Professor Nimmer relies on thirteen
points of similarity to conclude that Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet
and the musical West Side Story 163 are substantially similar in expres-
158. See supra part I.D.
159. Id
160. Wiley, supra note 100, at 124-25.
161. Id at 124.
162. Id.
163. Arthur Laurents et al., West Side Story, in ROMEO AND JULIET AND WEST SIDE STORY:
AN APPRECIATION (Norris Houghton ed., 1965).
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sion. 164 Although acknowledging that the works are dissimilar in many
respects and that one could legitimately disagree with the conclusion that
the listed similarities are of sufficient concreteness to constitute expres-
sion,1 65 Nimmer seems to assume that the description of the thirteen
points of similarity is valid. However, a plausible alternative interpreta-
tion of the very points that seem uncontroversial shows the inadequacy
of trying to locate idea and expression in an autonomous "work":
Nimmer
1. The boy and girl are members
of a hostile group
2. They meet at a dance.
3. They acknowledge their love in
a nocturnal balcony (fire escape)
scene.
4. The girl is betrothed to
another.
5. The boy and girl assume the
Alternative Interpretation
Maria in West Side Story is not a
member of a hostile group (the
gang) and is indeed unaware of
the hostility. The boy in West
Side Story has withdrawn from
the hostile group (the gang).
Romeo and Juliet at first both
carry the ancient grudge between
their families.
Romeo, who is despondent,
crashes a party on hostile terri-
tory, where there happens to be
dancing; Tony in West Side Story
is optimistic, and goes to a dance
on neutral territory, a place that
he has a right to enter.
The socioeconomic implications of
the difference between a mansion
balcony and a tenement fire
escape are significant.
Maria in West Side Story is not
betrothed to another (the charac-
ter Chino). Rather, her brother
wants her to marry Chino, but
has no control. By contrast,
Juliet's parents control her
destiny.
Romeo and Juliet actually are
164. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[A] at 13-29 to 13-31.
165. Id.
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marriage vows.
6. In an encounter between the
hostile groups the girl's cousin
(brother) kills the boy's best
friend.
7. This occurs because the boy
attempts to stay the hand of his
best friend to avoid violence.
8. In retaliation, the boy kills the
girl's cousin (brother).
9. As a result, the boy goes into
exile (hiding).
10. A message is sent to the boy
at his retreat, explaining a plan
for him to reach the girl.
married, causing dramatic conflict
when Juliet's father insists that
she marry another; Tony and
Maria perform a mock ceremony
before a dressing dummy and are
quickly returned to reality.
In Romeo and Juliet, Mercutio,
Romeo's friend, is not a member
of a hostile group, but a relative
of the Prince, a factor that leads
to Romeo's exile; in West Side
Story, Riff is the leader of the
hostile group. These distinctions
result in significant dramatic dif-
ferences.
Romeo stays the hand of Mercu-
tio on his own; Tony, who ini-
tially convinced the gang to have
a fist fight without weapons, tries
to effect a complete cessation of
hostility only at Maria's behest,
who therefore implicitly becomes
in pai delicto with Tony.
Romeo kills the cousin in self-
defense after the cousin returns
and tries to kill Romeo; Tony
kills the brother in an impulsive
act of revenge.
Romeo is involuntarily ordered
into exile by the Prince of Verona
under penalty of death; Tony flees
voluntarily. Hiding and exile are
not the same thing.
The message to Romeo is carried
by a neutral third party; the
message to Tony is carried by one
hostile to him. This distinction
results in a different dramatic
impact.
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11. The message never reaches Romeo's message never reaches
the boy. him because, through unforeseen
circumstances, the messenger is
delayed; Tony's messenger reaches
him, but she spitefully provides
misinformation.
12. The boy receives erroneous Accurate
information that the girl is dead.
13. In grief the boy kills himself In West Side Story, Tony at first
(or permits himself to be killed), asks to be killed, but he sees that
Maria is alive and thus desires to
live. However, his will to live
comes too late to save him.
Under the alternative interpretation, even without arguing about the line
between idea and expression, the very elements of alleged similarity need
not necessarily be accepted as similar at all. The point of this exercise is
not to show that one interpretation is better than another. Rather, it is to
show that even an interpretation that seems straightforward and merely
descriptive of a plot line is subject to challenge when the source of the
interpretation is only the text itself.
The instability of interpretation arises in more recent cases that seek
to distinguish between idea and expression. In Litchfield v. Spielberg,166
the Ninth Circuit considered whether Stephen Spielberg's E. T-The Ex-
traterrestrial infringed plaintiff's play Lokey from Maldemar. The fol-
lowing characterization of the facts, while accurate, emphasizes the
similarities between the works. The plaintiff's play was an adventure of
two aliens who, while temporarily.stranded on earth, befriend children,
display psychokinetic and other extraordinary extraterrestrial powers,
learn English and heal the sick. In E. T., an alien, while temporarily
stranded on Earth, befriends children, learns English, displays powers,
and heals the sick. In both texts, the aliens help fight the establish-
ment. 67 The court found that any similarities merely related to unpro-
tected idea, thus affirming a judgment for defendant.
While I believe that Litchfield reached a justifiable result, it nonethe-
less shows the danger inherent in seeking to differentiate idea from ex-
pression by interpreting an autonomous "work." The court found an
absence of substantial similarity of expression by defining supposed inher-
166. 736 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1984).
167. I&L at 1355.
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ent features of the "work"-namely, "plot," "theme," "setting," and
"character"-as unprotected idea. 168 This definitional approach to the
"work's" ostensible literary structure made Litchfield's holding for de-
fendants virtually inevitable.
Perhaps the approach in Litchfield would not be troubling if terms
like plot, theme, setting, and character had, as the court assumed, stable
meanings that could lead to meaningful interpretation of the work. The
case could just as easily have been decided the other way had the court
chosen to interpret plot, theme, setting, and character as "expression."
Such a choice would have been easy to make: only seven years earlier,
the same court held in another opinion that "characters," "setting," and
"plot" fall on the expression side of the dichotomy.16 9
The construct of the "work" promotes decisions whose questionable
reasoning creates the risk that the culture will be deprived of the tools
necessary for the dissemination of speech. For example, while Nichols
and Litchfield both reached what most believe to be the correct result,
they used methodologies that could as easily have supported a contrary
outcome. Similarly, according to Professor Nimmer, if Romeo and Juliet
were copyrighted, Shakespeare could, under a methodology seeking to
interpret the autonomous work, have prevented the dissemination of
West Side Story, a result that might not obtain under the above alterna-
tive interpretation.
The difficulty in trying to interpret "works" as if they were autono-
mous objects also underlies the courts' attempts to identify "expression."
Although the cases treat expression as the most valued portion of the
text, they rarely say what expression is. Rather, expression is generally
what is left over after "idea"-the chaff of copyright-is removed. Re-
cently, in Computer Associates International, Ina v. Alta Inc.,170 the
Second Circuit applied such a reductive process to a case involving al-
leged infringement of computer software, proposing that infringement of
software be determined by a three-step process involving "abstraction,"
"filtration," and "comparison." The "abstractions" step essentially re-
states Judge Hand's test, and suffers from the inadequacies of identifying
when a paraphrase becomes so abstract that it becomes "idea." The "fil-
tration" step specifically seeks to filter the protected expression from the
unprotected.171 Under that approach, so-called "elements dictated by ef-
168. Id. at 1356.
169. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th
Cir. 1977).
170. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
171. Id. at 706-707.
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ficiency," "elements dictated by external factors," and "elements taken
from the public domain" are unprotected:17 2
Once a court has sifted out all the elements of the allegedly infringed
program which are "ideas" or are dictated by efficiency or external
factors, or taken from the public domain, there may remain a core of
protectible expression. In terms of a work's copyright value, this is the
golden nugget.173
Yet though this "golden nugget" supposedly remains inherent in the
"work," the court in Computer Associates never attempts to define it.
"Expression" remains virtually indescribable, akin to a precious stone.
Interpretation according to the New Critical construct encourages either
unstable readings or no readings at all.
C. Idea and Expression Reconsidered in Light of Contemporary
Literary Thought
Nothing about the nature of the text requires that issues of "idea"
and "expression" be decided according to a New Critical construct of the
"work." As Paul Goldstein has noted, the terms "idea" and "expres-
sion" really constitute metaphors for competing policy concerns. 174 The
idea/expression dichotomy is most often justified as the best way to bal-
ance copyright's goal of encouraging the proliferation of texts (with its
inherent limits on speech) against free speech interests. 1 75 So-called ideas
receive no protection because protecting them would inhibit free speech;
ideas should therefore be available to all. 176 Protecting "expression," it is
assumed, will somehow encourage dissemination of information.
Restated in terms of the dynamic text,17 7 the idea/expression di-
chotomy prohibits a producer of a chronologically later text from utter-
172. Id. at 707.
173. Id. at 710.
174. Professor Goldstein states:
The line between idea and expression imports a significant policy judgment about the origi-
nal contributions that creators in a particular field should be allowed to monopolize and
those that properly belong in the public domain free for use by others working in the same
field. As a consequence, the line between idea and expression in a particular type of work
will respond to the particular conventions and aspirations that characterize that type of
work .... "[I]dea' and 'expression' should not be taken literally, but rather as metaphors
for a work's unprotected and protected elements, respectively.
1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, §§ 2.3.1, 2.3.1.1. Peter Jaszi describes the terms as an example of
replacing a pair of starkly contrasting terms (public v. private) by terms that downplay the funda-
mental contradictions at stake, namely the public's right to use textual material as against the au-
thor's rights to protect it. Jaszi, supra note 8, at 465, citing CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUss, The Structural
Study of Myth, in STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 224 (C. Jacobsen & B. Shoepf trans., 1963).
175. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 74, § 1.10[B].
176. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 1.10[B].
177. See supra part I.F.2.
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ing "expression" in the same way as the copyright holder, while
permitting this producer of the later text to utter "idea" in the same way.
The doctrine of scenes dfaire, well established as a principle in copyright,
provides a starting point for describing what is apparently at work in
copyright's idea/expression dichotomy. The so-called scenes dfaire doc-
trine affords no protection to patterns and situations that are "bound to
recur" 178 in a text.1 79 Scenes dfaire are thus said to be the "common
stock of literary composition." 180 The doctrine has been defined to com-
prise "situations and incidents which flow naturally from a basic plot
premise," 181 and as "incidents, characters or settings which are as a prac-
tical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a
given topic."'812
Copyright has traditionally approached the scenes dfaire doctrine in
modernist terms. Although the doctrine seems concerned with genre and
convention--context-dependent areas of inquiry-the cases describe the
178. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[B], at 13.62.2.
179. Eg., See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th
Cir. 1985); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976); 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[B], at 13-69.
180. Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 278 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (Yankwich, J.).
181. Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985).
182. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
Historically, the scines dfaire concept developed in a way that mirrored copyright's growing preoc-
cupation with the autonomous "work." What sounds like an early expression of the doctrine
emerges in American law as early as 1845 in Emerson v. Daly, 8 F. Cas. 615 (D. Mass. 1845) (Story,
J.) ('[I1f the similitude [between two works] can be supposed to have arisen from accident, or neces-
sarily from the nature of the subject.... the defendant is not answerable.") (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94, 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B. 1804)). As applied, however, the
concept of similarities flowing necessarily from the nature of the subject had a decidedly Romantic
cast. In a case considered to be an early application of the scines dfaire doctrine, the court held that
two stories based on a centuries old Oriental tale were not similar enough to establish copyright
infringement. In describing certain similarities between the texts, the court stated:
Of course in transferring the action of this story, centuries old, to modem times, the
criminals will not be Orientals, but highwaymen or burglars; their home will not be in a
cave or a hut in a wood, but in a rented room in a modern building; their surroundings will
be squalid, not comprising a separate kitchen; they will perpetrate their crimes according
to modem methods; if they are to be given poison, it will presumably be conveyed in meat
or bread, coffee or whisky. Resemblance between the story and the play in such minor
incidents are unimportant; not a single one of them is dramatic, exciting, or attractive . *.
The copyright cannot protect the fundamental plot, which was common property long
before the story was written.
London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1916). See Litman, supra note 12, at 123 n.127;
Leon R. Yankwich, Originality in the Law ofIntellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 462 (1951). Here,
what later came to be called scines dfaire were not worthy of protection because they were unimpor-
tant-not the product of creative genius-and were "common property," existing outside the text.
See also Ornstein v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Roe-
Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126, 127 (S.D. Cal. 1927) (stating that similarities "all
belong to the character of natural and expected happenings, considering the normal action of ani-
mals and persons placed as the characters are in the environment which we find them"). These
unprotected elements in these earlier cases come from nature or common sources outside the text.
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doctrine otherwise. Rather than attempting to place a particular text in
the context in which the reader engages it in light of particular literary,
social, technical, and cultural norms, in copyright the autonomous work
itself determines the existence of scnes dfaire, which like idea and ex-
pression are assumed to be elements contained in the work. 18 3 At the
same time, the doctrine of scenes dfaire constitutes an implicit criticism
of copyright's notion of the autonomous work, necessarily entailing an
inquiry that looks beyond the four comers of the text. In ComputerAsso-
ciates International, Ina v. Altal, Inc.,'84 the Second Circuit applied a
variant of the scenes d faire doctrine to withhold from protection "ele-
ments" in a computer program "dictated by external factors." The court
acknowledged that the programmer's "freedom of design choice" is often
dictated by mechanical specifications, compatibility with other programs,
manufacturer's design standards, demands of the industry being serviced,
and widely accepted programming practices within the computer indus-
try. 8 5 These considerations necessarily require that copyright look be-
yond the work to extratextual factors in a way consistent with the
principles of contemporary literary thought. 86
183. Judge Leon Yankwich, who is credited with coining the term "scines dfaire," writes:
The other small details, on which stress is laid, such as the playing of the piano, the prayer,
the hunger motive, as it called, are inherent in the situation itself. They are what the
French call 'scnes d faire.' Once having placed two persons in a church during a big
storm, it was inevitable that incidents like these and others which are, necessarily, associ-
ated with such a situation should force themselves upon the writer in developing the theme.
Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (emphasis added). Accord-
ing to Judge Yankwich, the "work" holds the preeminent position, actually "forcing" certain ele-
ments on the author. This approach stands the Romantic priority of author as the creator-genius of
the work on its head: the "work" imposes itself on the author, controlling how the author produces
the text.
184. 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir. 1992).
185. Id. at 709-10, citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[F], at 13-73.
186. In contrast, one of the earliest opinions on software, Whelan Ass'n, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1987), sought to deter-
mine the scope of protection of a computer program by limiting the inquiry to the confines of the
work. In Whelan, the defendant had allegedly infringed nonliteral elements of plaintiff's computer
program for management of a dental laboratory. Attempting to apply the idea/expression distinc-
tion based merely on the supposed inherent features of the copyrighted work, the court defined
"idea" as the work's utilitarian function and "expression" as "everything that is not necessary to
that purpose or function." Id at 1236. The court continued that, where there are various means of
achieving the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose and
constitutes expression, concluding that the idea of the program at issue was merely the efficient
management of a dental laboratory. Id.
Whelan thus approached computer software as other courts approach more traditional works,
seeking to delineate idea from expression by engaging in an act of interpretation and selecting a
particular paraphrase as "idea," while calling the rest "expression." The opinion in Whelan has
received much criticism, both from the courts and the commentators. See Computer Assoc., Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), and authorities cited therein. I would suggest that, once
again, the tendency of the courts to treat the work as autonomous contributed to what many believe
to be a poorly reasoned opinion.
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Thus, the scenes dfaire doctrine, although framed in terms reminis-
cent of the New Criticism's approach to the "work," implicitly recog-
nizes that the text is a context-sensitive process of speech. Scines dfaire
receive no protection because they are codes, conventions, and formulas
that should be available to all as the tools of discourse. According to this
approach, the "scenes dfaire" doctrine, rather than merely describing a
form of unprotected expression, informs the concept of unprotected idea.
"Idea" refers to those textual utterances that are ingrained in the social
and cultural fabric. 18 7 Put differently, "idea" is a shorthand term for the
codes and conventions at work in a given act of textual utterance.
Often, it might not seem difficult to find general agreement on what
constitutes an unprotected convention. For example, until recently it has
generally been accepted that "facts" should receive no copyright protec-
tion.188 Courts commonly justify this result on the ground that facts
exist and are merely discovered.18 9 And yet, even such an ingrained rule
of law has come into question, providing a testament to the instability of
the text. Scholars have recently recognized that facts have no necessary
stable existence, but are themselves texts.' 90 The distinction between so-
called "facts" and "creative works," therefore, rests on differing conven-
tions as to how to treat "fact" texts and "literary" texts, and not on any
inherent qualitative difference between the types of texts. Copyright thus
withholds protection from facts because it is conventionally accepted
that "fact" texts are necessary for discourse and belong to the culture.
The distinction is not merely semantic. To recognize that facts receive
no protection because of convention is also to recognize that convention
can change. The current treatment of facts as existing outside of the text
obscures this point. 91 "Expression," conversely, can usefully describe
187. See, eg., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 1.10[B], at 1-75 ("If writers and other
creators could not build upon the ideas of their predecessors, not only would free speech be stifled,
but the creative processes themselves-the copyright side of the definitional balance-would also be
severely circumscribed."); Litman, supra note 12, at 1015 (public domain exists to reserve raw
materials of authorship for common usage).
188. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). In Feist, the
Supreme Court addressed the scope of protection that copyright affords to directories and compila-
tions. The Court, almost by rote, set forth the old doctrines of originality and protection of facts,
eventually holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to copyright protection because its alphabetical
listing was not sufficiently "original" or "creative." But see Ginsburg, supra note 12.
189. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287.
190. See Ginsburg, supra note 12.
191. At first look, language-certainly, a source of the raw materials on which texts draw-
would not seem entitled to copyright protection. Yet, at least one court has suggested that some
languages, or even coined words, can receive copyright protection, a proposition that has particular
salience to copyright protection for computer software. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 72 (D. Mass. 1990). See also Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc. 276 F.
717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (L. Hand, J.). So what at first seems to be a rule about protection based on the
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how a given textual utterance varies or modulates or departs from code
and convention, giving a text its distinctiveness.1 92
This characterization of the idea/expression distinction is consistent
with how audiences engage texts. A text is necessarily governed by con-
texts-linguistic, rhetorical, cultural, and social. Analysis of genre, code,
and convention allows one to locate the text's conventionality and its
individuality vis-d-vis convention. 1 93 A reader on engaging a text will try
as closely as possible to identify the codes at work. 194 At this stage, the
nature of the text (languages are not protected because they are "building blocks") is in fact a rule
based on an accepted norm that certain languages receive no protection, a norm that may be in the
process of changing.
192. Benjamin Kaplan wrote twenty-five years ago:
Copyright law wants to give any necessary support and encouragement to the creation and
dissemination of fresh signals or messages to stir human intelligence and sensibilities: it
recognizes the importance of these excitations for the development of individuals and soci-
ety. Especially is copyright directed to those signals which are in their nature "fragile"-
so easy of replication that incentive to produce would be quashed by the prospect of ram-
pant reproduction by freeloaders. To these signals copyright affords what I have called
"headstart," that is, a group of rights amounting to a qualified monopoly running for a
limited time.
KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 74-75.
In computer software design, for example:
[P]rogramming can be likened to the creation of a play or novel; while the plot may seem
somewhat familiar (i.e., the same topic has been treated by more than one author) the way
the writer says something is new, or at least the writer has new insights into a particular
topic.
Richard A. Beutel, Software Engineering Practices and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can Struc-
tured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 4 (quoting
B. LiFFRIcK, THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS SOURCEBOOK: FROM CONCEPT TO COMPLETION x-
xii (1985). This "something new" actually refers to a shared view in a particular audience about
what is "new." Unless this "new" element is deemed so important to the dissemination of future
texts that it can be called, e.g., "essential to eficiency'"-therefore immediately becoming conven-
tional-it constitutes, for the law, expression.
Put another way, expression arises out of a textual producer's "misreading" of precursors. Cf.
Bloom, supra note 57, at 413 (production of creative works consists of author's misreading of prede-
cessors). The skilled textual producer, in copying his or her forerunners, "makes many interesting
mistakes" that give the text its distinctiveness. Imaginative error and rhetorical trope may be two
phrases that come to much the same thing, which can mean that an authentic writer is never in
much danger of legal plagiarism." Id
193. Id. at 262. For a practical example, see Lubomir Dolezel, Literary Text, Its World and Its
Style, in IDENTITY OF THE LrrERARY TExT, supra note 12, at 198. Dolezel attempts to show how,
in THE TRIAL, Kafka's use of naming-which has definite generic conventions-gives the text a
specific identity.
194. In receiving a work, the reader has to construct every feature in its level, by interpret-
ing signals at a lower level of organization. From ink marks we infer letters, phonemes,
word-segments, and other constituents, according to a system of learned conventions. And
if the conventions have not been learned, transmission may fail altogether, or the work may
be misconstructed and consequently misconstrued. If we cannot read Elizabethan hand-
writing, or know insufficient medieval grammar, or have never met William Carlos Wil-
liams' line-break conventions, we may not get far enough to grasp what the features of a
work are, let alone interpret them.
FOWLER, supra note 71, at 257. These codes and conventions are not fixed elements in a static work.
Rather, they are the aspects of communication that make some level of understanding possible,
aspects that differ depending on context.
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reader asks, what signals were sent, what vocabulary selections were
made, what conventions are used, what variations are present?195 The
reader imposes an identity upon the text after answering these questions.
This view of copyright protection conflates the idea/expression di-
chotomy into a single inquiry as to how the copyrighted text acts in light
of existing convention. Copyright permits rearticulation of the conven-
tional aspects of a text and prohibits rearticulation of the unconventional
aspects. 196 Describing the terms "idea" and "expression" in terms of
how a text employs the conventional aspect of the language gives due
regard to the dynamic, provisional nature of text identity. It does not
seek to determine idea and expression within the four corners of the
page, but rather looks to broader intertextual and extratextual material.
To reiterate, such an approach is not one of choice; rather, it is inevitable
that courts and juries will bring to their engagement with the text such
intertextual and extratextual material. The discussion here merely calls
for greater awareness about how texts function.
This is not to say that such a reassessment of "idea" and "expres-
sion" would not have profound effects on what copyright law protects.
The current formulation of the idea/expression distinction serves to ob-
scure strongly conflicting policy considerations in copyright cases. If
"idea" and "expression" are in fact not in themselves meaningful con-
cepts, but are really metaphors for "convention" and "modulation of
convention," then decisions about the same text could conceivably vary
from case to case. That is, conventions-generic, cultural, moral-may
differ from person to person and group to group and change over time. 197
Textual utterances that are in their early stages unconventional can be-
come conventional.198 Intensive imitation of a paradigm tends to influ-
195. Id. at 256.
196. Indeed, strictly speaking, the term "protection" is an inappropriate term, elevating yet
again the plaintiff's work to privileged status in copyright law. More accurately, copyright law
permits a defendant to utter certain speech and forbids him or her from uttering other speech.
197. Eg., FOWLER, supra note 71, at 11, 18, 170-90. As noted earlier, the conventions of defa-
mation have varied with political and social change. See supra note 73. Indeed, it is arguable that
the law's ability to regulate textual material reaches a crisis point when the cultural codes governing
textual construction are experiencing significant alteration. For example, the conventions allowing
courts to decide whether a text was obscene began to break down as cultural mores changed. Like-
wise, the current questioning of copyright law mirrors cultural and technological changes relating to
the nature of the text.
198. See Harris, supra note 12, noting that the character of Superman has become part of the
culture and arguing that copyright restricts creativity by continuing to protect a modern mythic
character that should belong to the culture. Indeed, one explanation for a finite period of copyright
is a recognition that, after a certain period, a text becomes conventional, Before the Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988), was enacted, common-law copyright of potentially unlimited dura-
tion existed for unpublished works, arguably because an unpublished work could not become part of
the culture's tools of speech. 1 GoLDsmIN, supra note 75, §§ 4.6, 15.1, at 471.
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ence the genre by reducing the distinctiveness of earlier texts in the eyes
of the next generation of readers. 199 In different contexts, a copyrighted
text utters different things. When this happens, texts change.
Once more, Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. illustrates a possible
consequence of recognizing that the idea/expression dichotomy in fact
seeks to identify convention. At the time of the lawsuit in Nichols, the
stock figures of "low comedy Jew and Irishmen" had existed for many
decades, 20° obviously constituting conventional literary figures. Indeed,
it is arguable that, with the great popular success of Nichols' play Abie's
Irish Rose, the conventionality of the characters-and the "plot line"-
reached its apex. Understandably, Judge Hand found neither the con-
ventional characters nor the common plot line protected by copyright.
The question arises, however, whether the characters and plot line
could under any set of circumstances have been considered "expression."
I would suggest that, in light of the nature of the text, such characters
might have possibly have been deemed to be "expression" in a different
context. For example, had the characters and plot line first appeared in
an American Romantic poem written in New England during the early
part of the nineteenth century and showed no obvious antecedents, they
could have conceivably varied existing convention. When the characters
and plot line later became conventional figures, they became "idea."
It is more likely, however, that the ethnic stereotypes portrayed in
,4bie's Irish Rose derived from the successive waves of Irish and Jewish
immigration into New York City during the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, which immigration inevitably gave rise to tensions result-
ing from different ethnic groups living in close proximity. Because the
original stock characters arose out of racial prejudice and ethnic hu-
mor-and perceived "facts" about Irish and Jews, as prejudiced as those
facts may seem now-it is probable that the characters in Nichols' play
were always conventional and never "expression," as copyright law con-
ceives that term.20 1 That is, under a dynamic view of the text, certain
textual elements can always be conventional from their first appearance
in a text. For example, because facts are treated as conventions, free to
all, Nichols' use in her play of supposedly fact-based ethnic characteris-
tics are simply "borrowed" tools of convention and are conceived of as
199. FOWLER, supra note 71, at 275.
200. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). The district court
opinion in Nichols, 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), discusses other
literary works using similar characters.
201. Indeed, the stereotype of the Jewish character may have had roots in Shakespeare's The
Merchant of Venice.
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fair game for subsequent authors. Moreover, the popularity of Nichols'
play tended even more strongly to conventionalize her characters and
plot line, making them more like "idea."
An approach to texts as speech whose meanings take shape in light
of code and convention could help overcome the conceptual problems
arising from attempts to interpret the "work." I return to Nichols and
Litchfield, each of which could have been interpreted differently under
copyright's current approach. Nichols could easily have been explained
as a situation in which the defendant took only unprotected code and
convention from the plaintiff's text, an explanation of the opinion that
John Wiley has essentially given.202 Similarly, Litchfield, though with-
out much analysis, justified its decision because some of the similarities
constituted no more than "stock scenes." 20 3 For example, both works in
Litchfield portrayed the characters as beneficent even though they at first
looked unattractive to humans. This has been a generic convention in
science fiction for some years.2° 4 Moreover, it has been noted that a host
of science fiction stories have portrayed aliens as the salvation of man-
kind2OS (as did, to some degree, the texts in Litchfield). Likewise, the
concept of aliens and humans learning to communicate with each other is
a characteristic code of science fiction.20 6
Acknowledging that the terms "idea" and "expression" really mean
"convention" and "modulation of convention" could encourage a debate
over whether certain elements of highly successful texts should, in fact,
receive less protection than the current system of copyright affords.
Those literary critics who challenge the copyright system bemoan the
artist's inability to exploit cultural icons (for example, the "Superman"
character). If the issue is cast in terms of "idea" and "expression," it is
easy for a court bound to a modernist notion of "work" to characterize
such popular characters as "expression," thus affording copyright protec-
tion to the owners of the characters without exploring in any detail the
countervailing social policies favoring lesser protection. Yet if, as I have
suggested, "idea" means "convention," then the copyright system must
confront the question whether a character like Superman has become a
cultural convention, and if so, whether that necessarily means that Su-
perman should be available to all. The answer does not necessarily flow
202. Cf Wiley, supra note 100, at 160-61 (concluding that Judge Hand decided that Nichols
herself was a borrower rather than a creator).
203. 736 F.2d at 1352.
204. Mark ROSE, ALIEN ENCOUNTERS 80 (1981).
205. Id.
206. See id.
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from characterizing the character as conventional. Rather, such a char-
acterization is but a first step in analyzing the scope of protection in such
instances. Protectionists might still persuasively argue from (for exam-
ple) an economic perspective that, if characters like Superman do not
receive copyright protection even after they become cultural conventions,
then the dissemination of texts will be inhibited. The counterargument
to this might be that a text, like Superman, that has become highly con-
ventional will ordinarily have reaped huge financial benefits for the copy-
right owners. It would thus not be unfair to permit the culture, which
has, through mass consumption of the text (for example, through such
diverse activities as repeated viewing of the text, word-of-mouth, idoliza-
tion) adopted aspects of the text as its own, to exploit those conventional
aspects. Again, the point here is not to suggest that one approach is
more appropriate than another. Rather, I merely argue that the insights
of contemporary criticism could allow courts and scholars to consider
more fruitfully the major policies underlying a particular decision about
scope of protection.
Treating the "idea/expression" distinction in terms of code and con-
vention might also raise the question whether copyright should protect
textual elements that were once conventional, but that have been lost or
forgotten. That is, textual elements once conventional can become un-
conventional. By way of example, this has apparently happened to Abie's
Irish Rose. In 1972, a television series entitled Bridget Loves Bernie aired
nationally on the CBS Television Network.20 7 The series portrayed in a
comedic fashion the lives of a newlywed couple, a Jewish husband and an
Irish Catholic wife. The husband was a struggling young writer who
supplemented his income by driving a cab; his wife was a school teacher
whose parents were wealthy. The show turned around the ethnic differ-
ences of the family and the attempts of the families to reconcile for the
sake of the young married couple.208 Television critics have noted the
resemblance between the show and Nichols' Abie's Irish Rose. 20 9
Yet because of changes in social attitudes, the portrayal of the ethnic
stereotypes had changed. Nichols' original play traded in blatant ethnic
stereotypes-for example, emphasis on accent, mocking of views about
dietary laws-that to many today would seem blatantly prejudiced.2 10
The television show did not portray the Jewish and Irish characters in
207. TIM BROOKS & EARLE MARSH, THE COMPLETE DIRECTORY TO PRIME TIME NETWORK
TV SHOWS 106 (1988).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 107.
210. Eg., ANNE NICHOLS, ABIE'S IRISH ROSE 101-03 (1924).
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the same harsh manner. Nevertheless, despite good ratings, 21 1 Bridget
Loves Bernie was canceled at the end of its first season. Undoubtedly, the
objection of religious groups to the show's condoning and publicizing
interfaith marriages played a role in the cancellation. 212 So, the culture
began in the early 1970s to "deconventionalize" the stock characters of
Jew and Irishman-even in a toned-down version-in response to chang-
ing mores and greater sensitivity to religious and racial prejudice. 213
What was once part of the common cultural fabric may soon be lost.
If cultural codes and conventions can become unconventional, the
question thus arises whether a later author who "rediscovers" what were
previously generic conventions may obtain copyright protection. Again,
copyright's current vision of the "work" as containing "idea" and "ex-
pression" obscures the policy issues behind this question, focusing on
what is "in" the "work" rather than on how a particular textual utter-
ance relates to the broader culture. On the one hand, one might argue
that, as a matter of First Amendment policy, once a textual element be-
comes conventional, an author should not be able to monopolize it, even
if the genre was lost and the convention long forgotten. Put differently,
even if a cultural tool for dissemination of information becomes rusty, it
would nonetheless forever belong to the culture. A contrary argument
would posit that copyright should encourage the dissemination of lost
conventions by giving protection to the "author" of those conventions.
For example, the United States Supreme Court has permitted a private
organization to remove from the culture the word "Olympic,"21 4 and an-
other court has questioned whether a once generic term can later be ap-
propriated as a trademark by a private entity.215 Once more, the
metaphor of "idea/expression" as currently treated in copyright law has
not permitted a full exposition of these issues, which could more usefully
be analyzed in light of the history of the textual convention and the rea-
son it faded as such.
Copyright's approach to interpretation of the text facilitates miscon-
ceptions in the cases because it artificially limits the range of intertextual
and contextual material available to a court, paradoxically increasing the
range of potential interpretations of a text and thus enhancing the pos-
211. BROOKS & MARSH, supra note 207, at 107.
212. Id.
213. Similar social and cultural changes have altered the notion of what constitutes defamatory
speech. See supra note 73.
214. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522
(1987).
215. The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, 971 F.2d 302, 306 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992)
("An interesting question is whether a word, although once generic, may become protectable.").
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sibilities of manipulation of the cases' outcomes. The concept of the au-
tonomous "work" can be problematic in another way, by serving as a
powerful rhetorical .device that allows a court more easily to disregard
certain policy concerns. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee216 is salient. In granting the United States
Olympic Committee a property right in the word "Olympics," the
Supreme Court stated that it would not allow the defendant to "appro-
priate the harvest of what others have sown. ' 217 The Court deflected the
free speech challenge by describing the most elemental tool of speech-
the word-as if it were a tangible object that could be "sown" and "har-
vested," and thus stolen. The imagery of basic agrarian labor completely
refocused the issues at stake. While the Court, more consistently with
contemporary theories of literature, could have treated the word "Olym-
pics" as a conventional text that has become part of the cultural fabric,
such an approach would not have served the ultimate result of trans-
forming an act of speech into an object of property.
In summary, the discussion here has not called for any particular
new system of copyright that would grant more (or less) protection than
the current system provides. Rather, it has sought to provide a structure
for analyzing the scope of protection that is more useful than the oft-
criticized idea/expression distinction. Because judges, jurors, lawyers,
and commentators are all readers, they are inevitably governed by con-
textual factors-generic, cultural, and social code and convention-when
engaging the text in a copyright case. Attempting to explain the "work"
in terms of "idea" and "expression" can obscure the true issues in a
copyright case; examining the text in light of underlying conventions at
work can shed light on those issues.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY AND LITERARY THOUGHT
A. Substantial Similarity and the "Work"
Ultimately, the critical question in an infringement case turns on
whether two texts share a certain "similarity." In one sense, in similarity
analysis, copyright law departs from its strict adherence to the notion of
the autonomous "work," rather attempting to account for how an audi-
ence engages a text. And yet, ultimately, the modernist notion of "work"
limits similarity analysis, resulting in unsatisfactory reasoning. Similar-
ity determinations are particularly pragmatic decisions, dependent on an
216. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
217. Id at 541.
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audience's generic, cultural, and social assumptions. 218 The central met-
aphor of copyright's similarity inquiry is the term "substantial similar-
ity." Broadly, the cases have used the term in two separate, though often
confused, ways. First, proof of copyright infringement requires that a
plaintiff show "copying," that is, that the defendant actually saw, heard,
or read the plaintiff's "work" and somehow modeled his or her work
after the plaintiff's work.219 Some courts have held that "substantial"
similarity, along with a showing of access (reasonable opportunity to see
or hear plaintiff's "work") will give rise to an inference of copying.220 In
this sense, the inquiry into similarity is directed at assessing human be-
havior, namely whether a defendant actually saw a plaintiff's product.
The assumption is that certain textual footprints-for example, common
errors or verbatim similarity-make it improbable that the defendant
created his or her text without relying on plaintiff's text.221
The term "substantial similarity" also describes the standard for
when a defendant has "taken" so much of plaintiff's protected expression
that copyright infringement has occurred. 222 Used in this sense, the con-
cept of "substantial similarity" seeks to draw the line between a defend-
ant's lawful use of a plaintiff's text and his or her misappropriation of
that text.
Both "probative similarity" and "substantial similarity" raise
problems in application. The courts and commentators have noted that
the concepts are often confused, and variously describe the inquiry into
substantial similarity as nebulous, 223 difficult,2 2 4 and meaningless. 22 5 Be-
cause the concept is central to copyright, this Article will focus on "sub-
stantial similarity" as the test of how much of a plaintiff's text a
defendant must take to be found liable for misappropriation.
218. See Eco, supra note 12, at 178 ("It is the user who decides the 'description' under which,
according to a given practical purpose, certain characteristics are to be taken into account in deter-
mining where two objects are 'objectively' similar and consequently interchangeable.").
219. Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity"s Proof of Copying" Toward Dispelling Some Myths in
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187, 1189 (1990); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353
(9th Cir. 1990); 2 GOLDSTEiN, supra note 75, § 7.2.1; 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74,
§ 13.03[A], at 13-25.
220. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74,
§ 13.03[1]; 2 GOLDSrEIN, supra note 75, § 7.2.1.
221. Alan Latman has suggested that this type of inquiry should more appropriately be called
"probative" similarity. Latman, supra note 219, at 1189.
222. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990); 2 GOLDSTE=, supra note 75, § 7.2.13;
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[l].
223. Robert F. Fleming, Substantial Similarity: Where Plots Really Thicken, 19 CoPYRIGrr L.
SYMP. 252, 262 (1971).
224. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[A], at 13.03 (what constitutes "substantial
and hence infringing similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law").
225. Cohen, supra note 12.
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The courts engage in remarkably little analysis of what it means for
two texts to be "substantially similar." Much of the discussion of sub-
stantial similarity focuses on what the doctrine does not require. For
example, it is said that trivial similarities are not substantial, that two
works need not be identical to be substantially similar, and that a defend-
ant need not repeat all of plaintiffs' work for substantial similarity to
exist. 226
In seeking to create an affirmative definition of substantial similar-
ity, the cases have identified two different approaches. The first posits
that texts can be substantially similar by virtue of some "objective
test,"' 227 "extrinsic test," 228 or "analytic dissection test. ' 229 This ap-
proach attempts to analyze the characteristics of autonomous
"works. ' 230 Supposedly, experts can assist a trier of fact in identifying
these objective similarities. So characterized, the objective approach to
substantial similarity approximates the New Critical view that trained
critics are most capable of analyzing the work.
Within the context of a trial, however, the expert testimony on simi-
larity does not inform the trier of fact about what is "in" the "work," but
instead acts as a contextual force that in effect changes the texts under
consideration. Ironically, moreover, the objective approach to substan-
tial similarity, by permitting analysis and expert testimony, inevitably ex-
ceeds the boundaries of the autonomous "work." Experts testifying
about a particular text generally invoke broader genres and prior texts to
support their testimony, thus placing the texts at issue in the lawsuit
against a broader intertextual context.
Copyright takes a second approach to the substantial similarity is-
sue, one that seems to break from the modernist notion of the self-con-
tained work. To prove substantial similarity, a plaintiff generally must
show that an audience will respond to the "works" at issue in a particular
way. In this sense, copyright recognizes to some extent that an audience
plays a role in actualizing the text-in other words that works in a copy-
right case have what might be called a "rhetorical" aspect.
226. Eg., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[A]. Nimmer views the problem as one
of "line drawing." In fact, the problem is copyright's inability to assimilate more useful notions of
how texts function.
227. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
228. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977).
229. Eg., Universal Athletic Sales v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975); Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
230. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. Paul Goldstein refers to this approach as the "protected expres-
sion" test. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, § 7.3, at 24-25 n.6.
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In seeking to identify the rhetorical aspect of texts at issue in litiga-
tion, the courts apply what they have called the "subjective, ' 231 "intrin-
sic," 232 "audience," 233 or "ordinary observer ' 234 test. This subjective
approach seeks to identify a stereotypical recipient of textual information
and then to determine how that reader will react to the texts at issue. In
creating the construct of the ordinary lay observer, the subjective ap-
proach values the supposedly pristine immediate response of a hypotheti-
cal reader, unsullied by expert analysis.235
Many have criticized the subjective approach to substantial similar-
ity.236 Some fear that the trier of fact will viscerally find substantial simi-
larity even where the defendant has taken only the unprotected portions
of the plaintiff's work.237 Conversely, others argue that the trier of fact
will fail to recognize infringement where the defendant cleverly changes
the text such that the response of the ordinary observer to each text dif-
fers.238 Applying the subjective test, courts and commentators often take
the rather tautological approach of defining substantial similarity in
terms of whether an audience would recognize the texts at issue as sub-
stantially similar.239
Although the subjective approach to similarity attempts to consider
the rhetorical aspect of the text, the approach fails precisely because
copyright conceives of the text as a self-contained, stable artifact-as
"work." Shaw v. Lindheim24° provides an example of this. In Shaw, the
Ninth Circuit considered the subjective approach in some detail, holding
that, once it is determined that works are substantially similar under an
objective standard, it remains for the jury to give a "subjective" assess-
ment of the "concept and feel" of the two works. 241 The court stated:
This subjective assessment is not a legal conclusion; rather it involves
231. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1990).
232. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
233. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, § 7.3.2.
234. Eg., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir.
1974); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 (holding that the intrinsic test depends on the response of the ordi-
nary observer); 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, § 7.3.2.
235. Eg., Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
236. Eg., Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Cohen, supra note 12, at 737; Gary L. Franccione, Facing the Nation:
The Standards for Copyright Infringement and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 519,
557-67 (1986); Manuelian, Note, supra note 12.
237. Eg., Manuelian, Note, supra note 12, at 181, 187-90.
238. Eg., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.03[E]; Fleming, supra note 223, at 274-75.
239. Eg., Ideal Toy Co. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that sub-
stantial similarity is present when the average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work).
240. 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
241. Id. at 1360.
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the audience in an interactive process with the author of the work in
question, and calls on us "to transfer from our inward nature a human
interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these
shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the mo-
ment, which constitutes poetic faith." S.T. Coleridge, BIOGRAPHIA
LITERARIA, ch. 14, reprinted in 5 ENGLISH LrrERATuRE: THE Ro-
MANTIC PERIOD (A. Reed ed. 1929). This interactive assessment is by
nature an individualized one that will provoke a varied response in
each juror .... 242
Essentially, the court concluded that, because of the necessarily subjec-
tive response of the reader, a court can never as a matter of law adjudi-
cate the "rhetorical" similarity of two "works." 24 3
Shaw represents a noteworthy attempt to account somehow for va-
rying reader response. However, by continuing to distinguish between
objective and subjective tests, the court assumes that, in one type of in-
quiry ("objective" or "extrinsic") the reader's subjective responses do not
play a role. But the background of an audience (whether judge or jury)
influences its conclusions about so-called "objective" similarities as much
as it influences supposed "subjective" responses. Indeed, all responses of
an audience are internalized, and are in that sense "subjective."
Moreover, Shaw's attempt to describe audience response rests on a
rather outmoded notion of author and work. The court quotes from
Coleridge, perhaps the quintessential Romantic poet and critic-who
has, ironically, been generally regarded as a "neurotic plagiarist."'244 In
Shaw, the author and the audience interact in a Romantic, metaphysical
way that makes analysis impossible. The court in Shaw seems to elimi-
nate the textual artifact from the rhetorical aspect of the inquiry. At the
same time, the "work" remains autonomous in Shaw, its fixed identity
preserved: supposedly, it is the reader whose responses are varied, not
the text that changes identity.
In addition, in attempting to find a standard for applying the "ordi-
nary observer" test-which rests on the assumption that a "work" gener-
ates a typical response in a stereotypical person--Shaw actually denies
the possibility that such a response exists. Quoting Shakespeare, Shaw
says: "[W]hat makes the unskillful laugh, cannot but make the judicious
grieve." 245 The court therefore emphasizes the diversity and subjectivity
242. Id
243. That is, once a court finds a triable issue of fact on "objective" similarity, it may not grant
summary judgment.
244. MCFARLAND, supra note 136, at 22. The court in Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1360, also quotes from
Shakespeare, who himself borrowed liberally from other writers. MCFARLAND, supra note 136, at
26.
245. 919 F.2d at 1360 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2, lines 27-28).
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of the individual response, mystifying the reading process. This ap-
proach raises the question whether, in the name of seeking the typical
response of the ordinary observer, it is fair to hinge the most important of
decisions in a copyright case on unpredictable supposed affective re-
sponses of the individual jurors.
Finally, in focusing on the "concept and feel" of the works at issue,
the Ninth Circuit again returns to the "work" as the autonomous source
of its meaning. An audience supposedly engages the texts at issue in an
infringement action "subjectively" as a way of determining characteris-
tics-"concept" and "feel"-that inhere in the work. But the court
never defines what "concept" and "feel" of texts are, or why they ema-
nate from the "work" rather than from the audience.
So while the cases attempt to acknowledge the audience's role in
connection with the text, the subjective test remains constrained by the
notion of the iconic "work." Only the "work" can be known through
analysis; the audience is a passive, unfathomable body on which the
"work" acts and whose immediate, superficial response to the "work" is
what really counts. By prohibiting any close analysis of audience, copy-
right stops short of actually considering the role of the reader in similar-
ity analysis.
B. Weakness of Current Similarity Analysis
Determinations of substantial similarity require, it would seem, that
a judge or jury, in light of the best available evidence, make complex
decisions about the texts at issue and about the audience that interacts
with the text. But under the common formulation of copyright's ordi-
nary observer test, the audience is merely a passive, amorphous body that
responds to the work, which acts upon the audience member.246 Indeed,
governed by the principle that audience response must be subjective and
unanalytical, courts will refuse to intervene when the response of the or-
dinary observer is at issue, even automatically refusing to permit sum-
mary judgment on the question whether an ordinary observer could
reasonably find two texts substantially similar.247 In this way, the ordi-
nary observer test fosters a form of legal nihilism that could have chilling
effects on potential defendants who disseminate textual material (for ex-
ample, publishers and members of the entertainment media), ultimately
depriving the public of valuable texts.
For example, proponents of author's rights and economic theories
246. Id
247. Id
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alike focus on why the producer of a text should receive the benefits at-
tendant copyright protection at the expense of hypothetical copyists who
would, if copyright did not exist, exploit the author's product. The more
immediate problem, however, is much different. Copyright infringement
cases against major motion picture studios, highly successful musical
composers, record companies, and computer software vendors brought
by non-mainstream "authors" are common. This means that the most
successful producers of creative texts are both the major targets of copy-
right infringement suits and potential plaintiffs who need to be rewarded
for their efforts. In part, because tests of substantial similarity may pre-
clude the possibility of a summary disposition, these major creators of
copyrighted material often go to great pains to avoid even the chance of
liability. For example, it is entertainment industry practice not to accept
unsolicited manuscripts, for fear of a later copyright suit in the event of
coincidental creation. Established producers of texts have a huge com-
petitive advantage, since they have already gained acceptance in the com-
munity and can get their material read and disseminated more easily
than those who are not established. In this way, the present copyright
system does not so much encourage textual production as reward pro-
duction that maintains the status quo.
More recent cases, implicitly recognizing the difficulties with the
"ordinary observer," choose other approaches to audience. Spurred by
developments in complex technology, courts and commentators have
recognized the need to identify a particular audience.248 One court has
suggested that, where the texts at issue fall within an arcane genre, sub-
stantial similarity depends on the response of an "intended" audience.249
Other courts attempt to predict the response of the average child 25° or
teenager. 25'
Problems arise, however, in trying to identify the reasoning behind
the courts' conclusions about how a particular audience will react. For
example, the choice of an "intended" audience raises conceptual
problems in identifyring intent. If intent means the "author's" intent, am-
biguities arise because the plaintiff/author may, at the time of creation,
have had no audience in mind, but instead may have created the text for
248. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734-36 (4th Cir. 1990); Michael F. Sitzers,
Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Sub-
stantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL L. REv. 385, 392 (1981); see Whelan Assoc. Inc., v. Jaslow Dental
Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
249. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736.
250. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166.
251. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 210 (9th Cir. 1988).
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purely personal reasons. Conversely, the ultimate consumer of the text
may not have been the one that the plaintiff consciously intended. A
producer of a text may subjectively intend to communicate to one group,
only to have another group act as recipient.
Moreover, while cases seeking to identify an intended audience often
draw complex conclusions about the interaction between a text and a
particular group---attempting to forecast, for example, behavior of chil-
dren or teenagers-these conclusions frequently depend entirely on what
the court perceives is contained "in" the "work," and not on evidence
about how an audience might actually respond.252 And even those
courts that rely on extrinsic evidence to predict how a particular audi-
ence will respond to a text often seem to act arbitrarily. For example,
one court permitted testimony from a celebrity psychologist about chil-
dren's responses to a doll, but rejected survey evidence of such
responses.253
In short, the law's methodology for deciding how an audience will
interact with the texts at issue in a copyright case is often ill-defined.
Courts applying the traditional ordinary observer test have occasionally
abdicated responsibility for decisionmaking altogether by concluding
252. Eg. Krofft. 562 F.2d at 1164 (opining on how children will respond to puppets, but not
stating the basis of the conclusion); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 210 (9th Cir.
1988) (predicting the response of the "17.5 year-old boy"). In Kroffi, the Ninth Circuit, based only
on the "work" and the court's subjective conclusion, decided whether a hypothetical audience of
children could find similarity between plaintiff's puppet-like characters and defendant's puppet char-
acters. Apparently without considering evidence on the issue, the court first called the reaction of
children to works "subjective" and "unpredictable." 562 F.2d at 1166. In rejecting defendant's
argument that the characters were dissimilar, the court concluded that "[w]e do not believe that [a]
reasonable person, let alone a child, viewing these works will even notice that [plaintiff's] Pufnstuff is
wearing a cummerbund while [defendant's] Mayor McCheese is wearing a diplomat's sash." Id. at
1167-68.
Krofft's example about a comparison between cummerbund and sash punctuates the problem:
contrary to Krofft's conclusion, a difference in an article of clothing on a costumed character may be
the very thing that a small child focuses on in making comparisons and in noting distinctions. For
example, over the past several years, the animated television series Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles has
garnered great popularity among small children, generating two feature length motion pictures and
vast merchandising revenues. The protagonists are four green humanoid reptiles who, for all intents
and purposes, appear (visually) indistinguishable except for two things: a letter on their belt buckles
standing for their first names and the color of their masks and arm bands. For small children who
cannot recognize letters, the color of a mask or arm band seems crucial. The point is that, without
some evidence of how an audience of children "makes meaning," there is no reason to accept Krofft's
conclusion about how children would react. Certainly, that evidence is not to be found "in" the
'.work."
253. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Blue Box Factory (USA) Ltd., 577 F. Supp. 625,
627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (accepting the testimony of Dr. Joyce Brothers). Of course, as an eviden-
tiary matter, courts can consider extratextual evidence of the actual markets for the texts of defend-
ants and plaintiffs. However, as Professor Goldstein notes, the audience test requires only a
potential market. 2 GOLDsMIN, supra note 75, § 7.3.2, at 33 n.36. Thus, such extratextual evidence
will not invariably be available, and the choice of audience must result from other considerations.
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that a court can never predict how an audience will respond. Even
courts that attempt to examine a target audience have engaged in hap-
hazard and conclusory analysis. In the next section, this Article pro-
poses a methodology that could encourage a more analytical approach to
audience response.
C. Reassessing Substantial Similarity as a Function of Audience
1. The Audience as an Interpretive Choice
If, indeed, the text is a dynamic event governed by code and conven-
tion, it would be useful in deciding whether two works are substantially
similar to consider the issue in light of such code and convention. How-
ever, conceiving a text in terms of cultural and social code and conven-
tion has little meaning if these terms are treated as inherent features of
the text. Rather, an approach to similarity based on the notion of a dy-
namic text must consider the interaction between textual artifact and au-
dience. While copyright tries to account for this "rhetorical aspect" in
similarity determinations through the construct of the ordinary observer,
it has done so with limited success. 254
In the final analysis, the issue relating to the proper audience by
which to test copyright infringement is not one of identification, but one
of choice. Choice of audience implicates policy decisions about how the
law will limit the range of readings available in a copyright suit, with a
concomitant effect on how speech is regulated. A choice of audience nec-
essarily affects the interpretation of the text, since the reader determines
the textual identity.
I would suggest that, as a matter of policy, there is good reason for
copyright to focus on what might be termed the "generically competent"
audience, that is, the audience that has the necessary linguistic, generic,
and rhetorical competence to perceive and understand the codes at work
in particular texts.2 55 "Generic or rhetorical competence... presup-
poses a knowledge of rhetorical and literary norms in order to permit the
recognition of deviation from those norms that constitute the canon, the
institutionalized heritage of language and literature. ' 256 If a particular
audience-say, the "lay" observer-lacks the knowledge of the generic,
rhetorical, and linguistic codes at work in the texts being compared in a
copyright case, it would not be prudent or fair for that audience to serve
as the yardstick by which substantial similarity is measured. Such an
254. See supra part IV.A.
255. See LINDA HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY 93 (1985).
256. Id. at 94.
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observer does not always know what to look for or how to listen, just as
one who cannot read a foreign language cannot usefully (for copyright
purposes, at least) pass judgment on a text written in that language.
Moreover, a generically competent audience would normally include the
market for the plaintiff's text, though it would not be limited to that
market. And the generically competent audience has the ability to dis-
criminate between convention and modulation of convention, thus avoid-
ing precipitous conclusions of similarity that an audience unfamiliar with
a genre may draw.257
So rather than speaking of a "lay" observer or of an "intended"
audience (unless this means a generically competent audience) copyright
infringement could more usefully be tested against the audience with
competence in the particular genres at issue in litigation. For example,
where highly technical texts are at issue, it makes more sense to test ques-
tions of substantial similarity against the expectations and response of an
audience that has competence in the genre.258 Similarly, an infringement
case involving children's television programs would test similarity in the
context of the audience with the most competence, that is, children.259
One might object to a system of copyright that would focus on the
generically competent audience by arguing that such a focus would fur-
ther complicate an already complex legal process. According to this ar-
gument, such an approach would embroil a judge or a trier of fact in
arcane debates about which audience should be "imagined" and how that
imaginary audience would respond. The problem with this argument is
two-fold. First, simplicity in a legal system is not a virtue if it results in
unsatisfactory reasoning or problematic decisionmaking. Second, choice
of the target audience does not necessarily raise complexities, and indeed,
finds precedent in copyright and in other areas of the law. For example,
even apart from those cases attempting to identify an "intended" audi-
ence,260 in fair use and damage inquiries, copyright cases have attempted
257. For example, two sounds in a particular musical genre may seem the same to an audience
unfamiliar with the genre-the uninitiated may believe that all "Rap" music sounds the same. By
contrast, the generically competent audience may find that the two "Rap" songs sound completely
different. It could be said that, for each audience, different signs and codes are at work. Copyright
makes a significant policy decision in selecting the audience as against which the text is examined.
258. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
259. See Sid & Marty Kroflt Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977). As another example, a generically competent audience would seem to be essential to test
whether a defendant may prevail on a fair use defense based on parody. This assumes a dual compe-
tence: knowledge of the codes and conventions of the texts at issue and knowledge of the codes of
parody. See HUTCHEON, supra note 255, at 94.
260. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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to identify an actual or potential market for a particular text.261 Simi-
larly, in deciding whether a woman has suffered sexual harassment in
employment, courts have attempted to predict the response of a "reason-
able woman. '262 And as mentioned earlier, in the First Amendment and
defamation context, the courts traditionally attempt to predict how a
particular audience will respond to a specific text.263
Choosing the generically competent audience is as critical to decid-
ing a copyright infringement case as analyzing the works at issue. The
selection of a generically competent audience will in the end depend on
acts of interpretation, themselves open to challenge. Nonetheless, by at-
tempting to identify, both through textual and extratextual evidence, the
generic competence of a group likely to engage a work, the law can go
beyond its present reliance on constructs that obscure the true issues in
an infringement case and that act as restraints on the audience, devaluing
its role in the textual process.
Problematically, the courts confuse the construct of the target audi-
ence with the trier of fact, and under various labels (intrinsic test, subjec-
tive test, ordinary observer test) insist that the trier of fact respond
without expert testimony or close analysis. 264 This confusion arises be-
cause the target audience seems to make its decisions spontaneously, im-
mediately, and without resort to analysis. But the target audience
already has a generic, linguistic, and rhetorical competence that allows it
to engage the text with a threshold level of understanding. In other
words, the generically competent audience already knows what it needs
to know.
A jury, however, will probably not consist completely of generically
competent individuals. Logically, the trier of fact would receive educa-
tion so that it can assess the works in a lawsuit from the perspective of a
generically competent audience member. This requires evidence not only
about the text, but also about the audience itself. The requirement that
the judge or jury base the ultimate finding of similarity on a visceral reac-
tion fails to give due regard to the role of the observer in making textual
meaning: the generically competent audience, it could be said, makes a
different text from the uninitiated audience, and the uninitiated must
gain some level of competence before they can decide infringement. This
261. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
262. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1990).
263. See supra note 73.
264. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. Of course, notwithstanding this insistence,
the trier of fact always plays a role in making the text, based on its own cultural and social back-
ground, as well as on the other textual material that it assimilates during trial.
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competence can only come from an educative process, analyzing both
audience and text.
Neither should the generically competent audience be confused with
the "expert" or the "critic." While the audience is a construct (though a
construct based on evidence of how real people behave) the expert (or
critic) acts as an alternative reader whose testimony may shape the trier
of fact's engagement with the text. The expert can help educate the trier
of fact about the linguistic, rhetorical, and generic codes that the generi-
cally competent audience has assimilated in connection with a particular
text. He or she can also opine about the conventions at work in a partic-
ular textual experience and about how a text may vary convention. Ex-
pert testimony thus constitutes extratextual information that the law, as
a matter of policy, will permit the trier of fact to consider. But the ulti-
mate determination of substantial similarity depends on what a trier of
fact-which does not necessarily (and, indeed, may not ordinarily) con-
sist of generally competent individuals-would conclude about the hypo-
thetical audience's responses to the text, and not on how experts
"interpret" it.
Adopting the generically competent audience as the focus of the in-
quiry into substantial similarity could as a practical matter break the ar-
tificial confines of the autonomous "work" and encourage an
interdisciplinary approach to copyright law. The process of identifying a
"generically competent" audience, far from leaving copyright issues to
the visceral reactions of jurors (who, depending on the court, will sup-
posedly either always react differently from each other or will automati-
cally reflect the response of the reasonable person) would permit courts
to examine the text's rhetorical aspect from a more concrete perspective.
For example, an analysis of audience response could involve a rhetorical,
scientific, literary, and psychological assessment of how a particular hy-
pothetical audience, familiar with a genre, would engage a text, seeking
to identify those things on which audience members might generally
agree.
Significantly, this approach is neither "objective" nor "subjective,"
terms that themselves have little meaning when trying to explain how
people engage texts. The objective and the subjective tests are not really
distinct at all. As a practical matter, one cannot describe how a text
functions-for example, by identifying how it uses certain generic
codes-without deciding how a reader (audience) will respond to the
text, that is, without identifying how a generically competent audience
engages the copyrighted text. To "dissect" a text-to describe how it
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works-necessarily also describes how the audience would respond to the
text, and entails an examination, not only of the text, but of the audience.
2. Toward a Definition of Substantial Similarity:
Plagiarism as Genre
Ultimately, a trier of fact in a copyright infringement case must de-
cide whether, because of a certain amount of similarity between texts, a
defendant has uttered prohibited speech. Two presuppositions underlie
this determination. First, the law must have a working definition of
"similarity" between works. Second, copyright must indicate what it
means for similarity to be "substantial" (that is, enough to penalize the
defendant's speech). The cases never really say what it means to be simi-
lar and how much similarity is "substantial."
Semantically, the term "substantial similarity" coincides with the
concept of the work as a fixed object of property whose "taking" a trier
of fact can quantify: the term "substantiality" specifically implies
"amount." But if the text is viewed as a dynamic speech event, the issue
of substantial similarity more logically entails a qualitative inquiry into
how a particular hypothetical audience would respond when engaging
two competing texts in an infringement action.
, The cases rarely define what it means for two texts to be "too much
alike." To begin to find a practical definition, it is important to recognize
that actionable similarity-plagiarism 265 -is akin to a genre itself, gov-
erned by social and cultural codes and conventions.266 To ask whether
two texts at issue in a case are substantially similar is really to ask
whether the codes and conventions at work in a second text lead to the
conclusion of plagiarism. However, this has remained implicit; the law
has not attempted to identify these codes and conventions.
Such an approach to plagiarism would seek to identify the generic
codes that leave the observer with the impression that one text has copied
another text and that so-called "protected expression" has been copied.
The purpose of such an inquiry goes beyond a mere literary critical inter-
est in plagiarism. Rather, it seeks to focus on the policies behind the
various invocations of the term "substantial similarity" as a means of
regulating the text.
265. Differently from many other definitions, I use the term "plagiarism" to mean the belief of a
reader, viewer, or listener that one text has been stolen from another. As used here, the term in-
cludes piracy and subconscious copying. Importantly, the definition in the Article focuses on the
reaction of an audience.
266. See Mellers, in Plagiarism-A Symposium, supra note 57, at 414 ("The idea of plagiarism
still raises extravagant passions in our community. It is therefore salutary to remember that the
concept is not absolute, but socially conditioned.").
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Importantly, the plagiaristic codes and conventions can vary de-
pending on the underlying genre of a particular text and the salient audi-
ence conduct. For example, an audience competent in the science fiction
genre will have a conception of plagiarism that differs from that of an
audience competent in computer software genre. In other words, as it
creates the underlying text, the audience plays a role in setting the
boundaries of plagiarism.
Literary criticism provides a firm basis for studying text that treats
plagiarism as a genre. Scholars have written studies on the closely re-
lated areas of artistic forgery,267 parody,268 pastiche,269 and satire.270 It
has been stated that genres are "types," in that a specific text in a genre
need not share the same characteristics with every other work in the
genre.2 71 Consistently with this formulation, plagiarizing texts may
share certain traits with other plagiarizing texts, but yet differ markedly
in other respects.
Moreover, "in literary communication, genres are functional: they
actively form the experience of each work of literature. ' 272 This ties in
closely with copyright's audience test: the character of the text varies,
depending on whether the necessary predicates for plagiarism exist.
Another characteristic of a genre is that it changes. 273 Plagiarism
has this characteristic. As noted before, plagiarism did not exist before
the Renaissance. 274 Thus, Shakespeare could borrow nearly verbatim
from Plutarch without raising in the minds of his audience thoughts of
plagiarism, 275 because plagiarism simply did not exist as a genre. Such
verbatim similarity meant something other than what it might mean
today.
It is true that a somewhat circular relation exists between a cultural
notion of plagiarism and the legal system of copyright. The law responds
to cultural codes of plagiarism, yet at the same time, shapes them by its
statutes and judicial decisions. In this sense, the law itself serves as a text
that modifies those codes. Nonetheless, it would seem that something
267. Eco, supra note 12, at 174-202.
268. HUTCHEON, supra note 255.
269. Id. at 38, citing various studies of pastiche.
270. I& at 43 and authorities cited therein.
271. FOWLER, supra note 71, at 38.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 11.
274. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
275. See MCFARLAND, supra note 136, at 25-26 (noting that some writers who are considered
plagiarists do not follow their source any more closely than does the speech of Shakespeare's
Volumnia, CoRIOLANUs, act 5, sc. 3, lines 94-124, but that Shakespeare is not ordinarily regarded as
a plagiarist).
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about certain texts, as a matter of convention, leads a particular reader to
respond that copying (or illicit copying) has occurred. Exploring these
codes of plagiarism could better define the boundaries of "substantial
similarity," revealing the effect of the concept on speech regulation.
Few literary critical studies of plagiarism exist; those that do gener-
ally either are anecdotal or fail to delve into plagiarism as genre.276 A
full-blown literary critical study of plagiarism lies beyond the scope of
this Article. However, the following discussion suggests some tentative
conclusions about the plagiaristic codes.
First, plagiarism would appear to be "restricted in focus."'277 Its
repetition is always of another discursive text.278 Like parody, for exam-
ple, the reader cannot perceive the plagiaristic codes without some
knowledge of a pre-text. Unlike parody and pastiche, however, the pla-
giarizing text does not invoke a pre-text, but rather suppresses it. An
element of deceit is inscribed in the text and forged by virtue of the in-
tertextual relationship. The plagiarizing text conveys a false sense of re-
ality relating to its position vis-d-vis prior texts.
Such suppression of truth exists in other textual forms. A contem-
porary example is the so-called docudrama, that is, the motion picture
that purports to be based on reality, but that instead "fictionalizes" cer-
tain of the events. Like plagiarism, docudrama that critics believe to
have unduly suppressed reality can generate cries of moral outrage, often
in language not unlike that used to condemn the copyright infringer. 279
Like plagiarism, these complaints result from the belief that a more valid
prior text-a greater "truth"--exists. 280
Second, to find plagiarism, the reader of two texts must conclude
276. Eg., THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS (1989); NEIL HERTz, Two Extravagant Teach-
ings, in THE END OF THE LINE: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SUBLIME 144 (1989); FRYE,
supra note 134, at 97; Plagiarism-A Symposium, supra note 57, at 413-15.
277. See HUTCHEON, supra note 255, at 40, 43.
278. Id.
279. Witness the criticism of Oliver Stone's motion picture JFK, depicting the investigation of
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Compare George F. Will, "JFK" Paranoid History,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1991. at A23 (in which George F. Will calls the film a "travesty" and "an act
of execrable history and contemptible citizenship by a man of technical skill, scant education and
negligible conscience," and states that Stone "falsifies so much that he may be an intellectual soci-
opath, indifferent to truth") and Kenneth R. Clark, Filling in Fact with Fiction: Makers of TV
Docudramas Say 'JFK'Plays on a Different Channel, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1992, at C1 (Stone's crime,
in the eyes of the critics, is that he took a historical event, hired actors to recreate the action, made
up dialogue where he could find no account of necessary conversations, and invented characters to
keep his storyline moving") with Michael Moore, Counterpunch: Roger,' "JFK' and Me: The Official
Story, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at F3 ("The furor that gets kicked up over films like 'Roger & Me'
and 'JFK' has everything to do with the fact that these films challenge the 'official story' and en-
courage their audiences to put down their Goobers and Twizzlers and do something.").
280. Analogously, classical Platonic philosophy condemned art as a corruption of reality. See
supra note 14.
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that the same codes and conventions are at work, and importantly, the
same variations and modulations. This self-evident proposition focuses
the inquiry on the key aspects of the texts at issue and ultimately allows
the law to define for the trier of fact the boundaries between permitted
and restricted textual utterance.
Third, the codes of plagiarism would postulate that there are no
codes and conventions that overbear the codes that would otherwise
point to plagiarism. Parody provides an example of a genre containing
codes that conflict with codes of plagiarism. Parody, like plagiarism, re-
peats another discursive text, but the parodying text suggests an encoded
intention to imitate an earlier text with critical irony.281 In contrast, the
plagiarizing text suggests an intention to deceive or falsify.282 An ap-
proach to plagiarism as a genre helps explain why current copyright law
treats certain texts as infringing and others as not. For example, it is
assumed, both legally and culturally, that a verbatim identity between a
plaintiff's work and a defendant's work is highly indicative of plagiarism.
However, this assumption results, not from any inherent characteristics
in the two works, but in a conventionally accepted belief that such verba-
tim identity constitutes plagiarism. As discussed earlier, even a verbatim
rendition of what is thought of as a single text can be transcontextual-
ized, that is, can change.28 3 Nonetheless, as a matter of convention, an
audience assumes that two different textual acts are the same if they
share a verbatim identity.
Conversely, verbatim repetition of a plaintiff's text does not invaria-
bly constitute plagiarism, depending on the particular genre and audi-
ence. Where verbatim repetition is formulaic or highly conventional, a
reader familiar with the underlying genre will not employ the codes that
lead to the conclusion of plagiarism. That is, a reader familiar with codes
of a particular genre will recognize verbatim similarities as merely ge-
neric codes and not as plagiaristic similarities (as, for example, in the
words in children's stories "once upon a time" and "they lived happily
281. HUTCHEON, supra note 255, at 40-41. As a generic, if not a legal matter, such critical irony
distinguishes parody from plagiarism.
282. The reader recognizes still other signals in the plagiarizing text. Culturally, if not legally,
an audience will tend to recognize plagiarism where it perceives that a plaintiff engaged in significant
labor in articulating his or her text, labor that the defendant avoided by copying. "In a moral sense
[plagiarism] means something that makes use of somebody else's efforts and exertions." Goodman,
in Plagiarism-A Symposium, supra note 57, at 413. Yet, the cases purport to exalt "originality"
over labor. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (rejecting "sweat
of the brow" doctrine of protection for compilations of facts). Similarly, as cases recognize, a prob-
able code of plagiarism seeks to determine whether defendant's text will reduce the market for plain-
tiff's. E.g., Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
283. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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ever after"). And, a verbatim rendition of the plaintiff's text as a "frag-
ment" of the defendant's text will not give rise to a finding of plagiarism
if the plaintiff's textual material played an insignificant part in the plain-
tiff's text, or if the plaintiff's textual material is generic. 284
Moreover, it is generally recognized in many genres that nonverba-
tim rearticulations of a text can still be plagiarism if significant textual
material modulates or varies underlying generic code in the same way.
This conclusion turns on whether, as a matter of convention, the audi-
ence concludes that the similarity in modulation is a significant aspect of
the text at issue and that the differences in modulation are not. In other
words, what makes a variation important is a product of the primary
codes at work in the texts under examination; a reader or viewer for
cultural and social reasons will consider a particular characteristic of a
text more important than others. For example, the so-called "hook" is
ordinarily the most memorable aspect of a popular song. Whether a pas-
sage is the hook of a song depends, in turn, on generic and rhetorical
convention regarding what gives a particular passage value (for example,
whether the lyric accompanying the music contains the song's title,
whether the passage is part of a refrain, how often the passage is re-
peated, whether the passage begins the song). The generic code of plagia-
rism in a music copyright case would posit that plagiarism is more
piobable where the defendant's musical text repeats the hook of the
plaintiff's song, even though the texts otherwise differ.28 5
The suggestion that the law consider codes and convention in decid-
ing substantial similarity-a suggestion that calls for a semiotics of plagi-
arism-seeks a standard for delineating the legal elements that determine
whether an audience will perceive two works as substantially similar.
Some elements are familiar and more easily stated-for example, verba-
tim similarity means copying unless the textual similarities are mere for-
mulas or conventional similarities. Yet there are undoubtedly numerous
other factors that, in the present cultural setting, lead to the conclusion
that one text plagiarizes another. As a matter of legal principle and evi-
dentiary proof, identifying these elements is critical in reaching a rea-
soned conclusion as to when and why two texts are substantially similar.
Yet again, an examination of Judge Hand's opinion in Nichols can
284. Of course, the question whether textual material in the plaintiff's text is important or not
itself requires an examination of plaintiff's text in term of its own generic and rhetorical codes and
conventions.
285. Cf Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(finding infringement where, among other things, defendant's song "My Sweet Lord" repeated the
musical passage that began plaintiff's song, that was frequently repeated in plaintiff's song, and that
accompanied plaintiff's title lyrics "He's So Fine").
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show how choice of audience and the codes underlying plagiarism can
help a court or trier of fact reach similarity opinions. In the 1920s, when
Anne Nichols' play was at the height of its popularity and the conven-
tional stock figures of Jew and Irishman were well known by the popular
culture, the choice of audience construct may have properly focused on
the average person generally familiar with the popular media. In com-
paring Abie's Irish Rose with defendant's The Cohens and the Kellys, the
audience would, for example, have probably recognized the comedic Yid-
dish dialect and harsh portrayal of the Jewish fathers as a conventional
humorous treatment that had no pejorative social or political implica-
tions. The similarities in character portrayal would therefore not neces-
sarily have signaled plagiarism to such an audience. However, an
audience of the 1990s unfamiliar with the generic codes and conventions
of the 1920s might view the similarity analysis quite differently.' Nichols'
depiction of the Jewish father and the other Jewish characters, rather
than being seen as humorous and benign, might appear to such an audi-
ence to be highly offensive, as did the depictions in the more prosaic
Bridget and Bernie television series of the 1970s.286 Because the stereo-
types of Nichols' play are no longer conventional, their portrayal could,
to a 1990s audience not competent in the genre of 1920s ethnic comedy,
seem an important and striking indicium of similarity between Abie's
Irish Rose and The Cohens and the Kellys, tending to cause this audi.nce
to invoke codes of plagiarism where they otherwise should not have. In
such a situation, it would be important to identify the target audience
and to educate the trier of fact about the genre of the 1920s. Signif-
cantly, however, the example shows how texts and notions about similar-
ity can change.
V. FAIR USE AND THE CONCEPT OF THE "WORK"
It may be argued that any rigidity caused by copyright's notion of
the autonomous "work" could be ameliorated by copyright's traditional
"safety valve," that is, the defense of fair use, and that as a result, a
reassessment of copyright in light of recent literary thought is unneces-
sary. Indeed, the defense of fair use is often cited as the means by which
to avoid rigid application of the copyright laws when such application
would stifle the very creativity that the law is designed to foster.287 In
this section, this Article briefly discusses the fair use doctrine, showing
.286. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
287. 3 NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.05 at 13-80 (quoting Iowa State University
Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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that the concept of autonomous "work" also undercuts the doctrine of
fair use.
According to Professor Nimmer, in its meaningful sense fair use
comes into play as a defense only where two texts have already been
deemed substantially similar.2 8 However, even though the fair use doc-
trine supposedly alleviates what would otherwise be an unbending con-
cept of property, the construct of the "work"r-the reification of the
text-provides a built-in bias toward the plaintiff's work.
As a rhetorical device, the very term "fair use" demonstrates how
the idea of the "work" carries with it a presumptive moral aspect about
texts in a copyright case. The term "use" presupposes something akin to
a physical object of property that one can "occupy." Use implies a tak-
ing of a "thing" belonging to another. Indeed, rarely, if ever, has the law
employed the term "use" in connection with something other than a
property interest. This presumption reflects a conception of the text as
an object of property, belonging to an "author." The plaintiff's status as
"author" immediately elevates his or her position vis-a-vis the defendant,
who is a mere "user," no matter how creative the second work may be.
A defendant who seeks to "use" that object without permission is viewed
with initial suspicion, unless he or she falls within the anointed categories
of, for example, "scholar," "educator," or "critic. ' 28 9 Similarly, the ad-
jective "fair" reflects a particularly moralistic view of copyright infringe-
ment. Indeed, the defendant's "good faith" is a factor that the courts
will consider when deciding if the defense applies.290 It is not surprising
that, in determining whether the defense of fair use applies in a particular
case, the courts often resort to morally judgmental terms. For example,
fair use "distinguishes between 'a true scholar and a chiseler who in-
fringes for personal profit.' ",291 The Supreme Court has declined to find
fair use where the defendant "scooped," "pirated," "exploited," and
"purloined" plaintiff's manuscript. 292 Another court declined to apply
the fair use defense where the defendants' lyrics were "dirty. '293
288. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 74, § 13.05 at 13-800.
289. See infra part V.A.l.
290. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
291. Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978) (quoting Hearings on Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright
Law before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., set. 8, pt. 3, 1706 (state-
ment of John Schulman)). Harper & Row, Publishers, Ina, 471 U.S. at 563, favorably quotes this
statement.
292. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 556, 562-64. The Court's wisdom in using
these condemnatory words has been questioned. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 743
(2d Cir. 1991) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
293. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981).
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The law need not inevitably approach the fair use doctrine in this
way, however. All textual producers rely on texts of their predeces-
sors. 294 The conduct at issue in copyright in general, and in "fair use"
analysis in particular, can in light of recent literary thought be described
in terms far different from "use." For example, rather than "using" a
plaintiff's text, a defendant can be said to have "transformed" an earlier
text.295 Or the defendant's text may constitute another "reading" (or
"misreading") of a predecessor.296 Or the texts at issue in fair use analy-
sis may exist as competing utterances, spoken in different contexts. Sig-
nificantly, none of these characterizations rely on the objectification of
the work-as the term "use" does-and each has a less pejorative
connotation.
Semantically, by reifying the text as "work," its "use" becomes
theft, with all the attendant moral connotations. By contrast, the inter-
ests at stake may seem far different if a copyright infringement case is
viewed as a resolution of the competing right of speakers to engage in
acts of speech-a more realistic view in light of contemporary literary
thought. It is simply more palatable to impose liability against one who
steals a "work" than it is to impose liability on someone who is "speak-
ing" a text.297
The modernist concept of the "work" underlies practical attempts
to define the scope of the fair use defense. Section 107 of the Copyright
Act of 1976298 sets forth the nonexclusive factors to be considered in fair
use determinations. Each of these is problematical because of the law's
insistence that the text is an autonomous work.
A. The Character and Purpose of the Defendant's Work
1. Scholarship, Teaching, News Reporting, Criticism: The Anointed
Defendants
In deciding whether a defendant may avail himself or herself of the
fair use defense, the courts and Congress have focused on the nature and
purpose of the defendant's text. Section 107 gives several examples of
texts whose "purposes" may warrant a finding of fair use. These include
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
294. See supra part II.E.
295. Cf. Litman, supra note 12, at 975 (describing process of authorship).
296. Bloom, supra note 57, at 413.
297. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 131
(1991) ("In copyright litigation... an accusation that a defendant has stolen the plaintiff's property
is much more powerful than the claim that a defendant is exercising a free-speech right.").
298. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
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for class room use) scholarship, or research." 299 It follows that works of
these types enjoy a preferred status in copyright.
The emphasis on traditionally academic endeavors reflects the mod-
ernist, New Critical tendency to privilege some types of readings over
others. Copyright, like the modernist approach to the work, makes the
critic sovereign at the expense of both author and reader.300 Neither au-
thorial intention nor audience response have validity under this theory;
rather, interpretation becomes the anointed object of literature.3 1 And
the favored group under this approach becomes the critic-the scholar
who makes criticism a science. The critic finds validation, however, only
if he or she can interpret something akin to an object with a fixed iden-
tity: the "work." Post-modernist thought, however, demystifies the
critic, who becomes just another reader. The critic is no longer con-
ceived as a person with special knowledge who can learn the true mean-
ing of a work, but rather as another reader of a text whose interaction
with it depends on the context in which this reader engages the text. The
fair use exception for educational or scholarly works, therefore, reflects a
preference in copyright law for the supposed hieratic, to the prejudice of
the demotic.302 This policy, however, rests on nothing inherent in the
nature of copyrighted "works." For example, in Stewart v. Abend,30 3 the
Court rejected defendants' contention that the re-release of the Alfred
Hitchcock motion picture "Rear Window" was educational rather than
commercial. The Supreme Court dismissed this contention out-of-hand.
Yet the motion picture is generally considered a work of high aesthetic
quality, while the underlying short story is virtually unknown and in fact
now owes whatever fame it has to the motion picture. It is hard to un-
derstand why the re-release, and therefore broad dissemination, of a clas-
sic work of art is not more edifying than a little known short story, or for
that matter, an academic monograph about a little known literary genre.
The point is that words like "scholarly" and "educational" are merely
299. Id.
300. See supra note 47.
301. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
302. This preference extends beyond the fair use doctrine. In similarity analysis, perceived artis-
tic works-though the artistic work may be nothing more than a decorative plate with the words
"You Are Special Today"-are considered more worthy than factual works. McCulloch v. Albert
E. Price, Inc. 823 F.2d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, in determining whether a particular work
meets the threshold level of originality, the courts have shown a bias against protecting "low" forms
of art. See, eg., L Batfin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (denying protec-
tion to mass-produced commercial "Uncle Sam" banks, though plaintiff's work seemed to satisfy the
"trivial variation" criterion for originality of Alfred Bell & Co. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d
99 (2d Cir. 1951)).
303. 495 U.S. 207, 227 (1990).
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labels that give the impression that one can distinguish between worthy
and unworthy texts.
2. Parody
Copyright's ambivalence toward the status of parody also reflects
the law's preference for "higher" works. While it is generally accepted
that parody is entitled to some fair use protection, the courts have faced
difficulty in deciding when parody constitutes fair use.
Parody tends to break down the objectivity of the work, changing its
meaning by recontextualizing it for a subsequent audience. 3°4 Parody,
furthermore, strongly depends on the audience's interaction with the
text: "Parody... can therefore be said to require a certain institutional-
ized set of values-both aesthetic (generic) and social (ideological)-in
order to be understood, or even to exist. The interpretive or hermeneutic
situation is one based upon accepted norms, even if those norms only
exist to be transgressed ... .,3o5 Copyright views parody differently,
failing to recognize the importance of audience and context. Rather than
focusing on the audience and the rhetorical aspect of parody, the cases
rely on "work" and "author" as a means of determining when parody
constitutes fair use.
Courts addressing the scope of protection for parody generally as-
sume that the issue of fair use does not arise unless the defendant's work
has "taken" or "appropriated" from the original.306 The law's choice to
use the terminology of "taking"-a semantic choice that is not inevita-
ble-at the outset of the inquiry focuses on a presumptive "object" (the
"work") rather than on a dynamic text.
Although parody is context-dependent, the parody opinions do not
even purport to consider audience response. Instead, the cases suppos-
edly decide whether a defendant's text constitutes parody merely by ex-
amining the objective characteristics of the two works at issue. But by
definition, parody does not inhere "in" the work, but instead depends on
the convergence of texts and audience in a particular context.
Certain parody opinions focus on authorial intent in deciding
whether a work constitutes a parody protected by the fair use doctrine, in
this way also ignoring the audience's role in actualizing the parodic text.
304. See Harris, supra note 12.
305. HUTCHEON, supra note 255, at 95.
306. Eg., Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), modified, 777 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434-35 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1986) (rejecting claim that taking was de minimis and stating "[h]ere, the appropriation would
be recognized instantly by anyone familiar with the original").
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In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,307 plaintiffs contended that defendant's "Cunni-
lingus Champion of Company C" infringed the song "Boogie Woogie
Bugle Boy of Company B." In rejecting the parody defense, the court
stated:
At trial, defendant Wilson testified that, at the time he wrote Cunnilin-
gus Champion, he did not intend it to be either a burlesque or a satire.
He stated that, sometime during the rehearsals that followed the song's
unveiling, he formed the intent that the song would be a burlesque of
the music of the 1940's.308
The court seemed to believe that, at the time of creation, the identity of
the "work" was fixed and that subsequent authorial expression of inten-
tion was irrelevant. This highlights the problems inherent in trying to
find textual identity based on authorial intention. The court rather arbi-
trarily limited the author's intention to a specific period, based on the
false notion that once a work comes into existence, its features never
change.30 9 In this way, the cases objectify, not only the copyrighted
work, but also the allegedly infringing work, treating the defendant's text
as a "thing" that has immutable properties.310
Neither is the courts' definition of parody consonant with the way
literary thought approaches the parodic text. Some courts require the
defendant's work to "poke fun" at social or cultural norms.31' Others
imply that the plaintiff's work must be the "target" of the parody.3 12
And as a legal matter, parody seems to require "comic effect" and "ridi-
cule. 3 1 3 In fact, however, parody is an "imitation by ironic inversion,
not always at the expense of the parodied text .... Parody is, in another
formulation, repetition with critical distance, which marks difference
rather than similarity. '31 4 By insisting that parody ridicule, therefore,
the law draws arbitrary lines regarding what constitutes parody.
307. 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981).
308. Id.
309. E.D. Hirsch would call the author's second expression of "intent" merely an interpretation
of his own work. HIRSCH, supra note 12, at 6-8. However, this approach is problematic in copy-
right, since Hirsch chooses the original intent as the valid meaning of a text for ethical reasons, not
because of the text's ontological status. I at 24.
310. This reliance on authorial intention raises another fundamental problem. Modem literary
theory teaches that authorial intention is an elusive construct. Despite what Wilson "thought"
about his song, there seems no question that a particular audience could interpret his work as a
parody of plaintiff's work. Yet the court entirely eliminated the audience from the inquiry.
311. Eg., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986).
312. Eg., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert granted 61
U.S.L.W. 3545 (March 29, 1993); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1981).
313. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d at 1435; New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music
Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
314. HUTCHEON, supra note 255, at 6.
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3. Commerciality of the Use
Another aspect of the inquiry into a work's purpose focuses on
whether a defendant's use is of a commercial nature or rather is for non-
profit educational purposes.3 15 Works of a commercial nature receive
less protection under the fair use doctrine. Here, too, the notion of the
"work" dominates fair use analysis, this time in the conception of the
supposedly infringing work.
The concept of "commerciality" is inseparable from the notion of
objective property. Historically, the text became objectified as "work"
only when a market for texts came into existence.316 Under the fair use
doctrine, the defendant's text that has no commercial purpose-for ex-
ample, that is not fixed in a tangible medium or is not widely distributed
for profit-is in some sense less a "thing" than a defendant's work that
has as its target a commercial market. Only where the defendant's work
becomes fully reified-through its commercial purpose-does it pose a
threat to the plaintiff's work, which the law has already reified. The
"work"-in fact, a metaphor-becomes an end in itself, worthy of
preservation. 317
Moreover, the concept of "commerciality" does not adequately es-
tablish the parameters of the fair use doctrine. As others have noted,
attempts to characterize a particular text as commercial or not is an act
of interpretation that strongly depends on context and audience engage-
ment with the text. 318 The concept of "commercial purpose" is therefore
an interpretive construct rather than a property of a particular infringing
work. The contemporary critical realization that texts have no fixed
identities therefore calls into question the distinction between "commer-
cial" and "noncommercial" purposes, just as critical thought has ques-
315. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
316. See RosE, AuTHORs AND OWNERS, supra note 13, at 55-56. Similarly, the history of real
property law demonstrates that the vision of real property as a "thing" arose when the feudal system
ended and a market for real property developed.
317. A recent Sixth Circuit opinion, Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th
Cir. 1992), cert granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3545 (March 29, 1993), reflects this view. In that case, the
court, reversing a district court opinion, held that a song by the group 2 Live Crew was not a fair use
of the Roy Orbison song "Pretty Woman." In emphasizing the commercial nature of the defend-
ants' use of plaintiff's "work," the court stated: "It is likely, for example, that an identical use of the
copyrighted work in this case at a private gathering on a not-for-profit basis would be a fair use." Id.
at 1439. The commodification of the text, according to this view, supposedly transforms it.
318. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1988) quoted in 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 74, § 13.05[A], at 13-84; See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech? 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990). Kozinski and Banner note that some modem television "com-
mercials" cannot be determined to be such by referring either to the work itself or to the intent of the
creator. Id. at 639-43. Attempts to apply the distinction in fair use doctrine raises similar problems.
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tioned the concept of the objective "work." So the tendency to grant fair
use protection to one "type" of "work," but not the other, becomes dubi-
ous, suggesting that the policies behind the original distinction need
reexamination.
B. Nature of the Work
The courts are also supposed to inquire into the "nature" of the
plaintiff's work in deciding fair use. This inquiry has two aspects. First,
a court will examine whether or not the plaintiff's text is a creative prod-
uct.31 9 Second, it will ask whether the plaintiff has published the
work.320 That a plaintiff's text is "creative" or "unpublished" weighs
against a finding of fair use.
In privileging so-called "creative" or "fictional" texts in fair use
analysis, the doctrine once more shows a preference for so-called "liter-
ary" discourse. That is, the law assumes that it can distinguish between
creative or artistic works on the one hand, and more common discourse
on the other. The latter receives less copyright protection. The distinc-
tion between the literary and nonliterary, characteristic of modernist
thought, 321 now proves to be a questionable one. Even the distinction
between "facts"-which supposedly exist independently of the text-and
creative works has become difficult to sustain.32 This undercutting of
the concept of hierarchies of discourse poses a challenge to the fair use
doctrine's attempt to distinguish between the creative and the
noncreative.
Unpublished works also receive greater protection under the fair use
doctrine than published works. The language that the opinions use in
justifying this greater protection recalls the sixteenth century metaphor
of paternity, during which the work was viewed as the offspring of an
author.3 23 For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the period
encompassing the work's initiation, its preparation, and its grooming for
public dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor. '324 This
greater protection for unpublished works does not depend solely on what
might be considered an extratextual fact, to wit, the author's right of
privacy. Even an author with no interest in privacy may avoid a fair use
defense because a work is unpublished.3 25 Instead, the central metaphor
319. Eg., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
320. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).
321. See supra part I.D.
322. See Gordon, Reality as Artifact, supra note 12, at 98-100; Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 1913-
16.
323. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
324. Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 471 U.S. at 554.
325. Id. at 554-55.
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of the published/unpublished distinction is the notion that the unpub-
lished work has an embryonic status vis-d-vis the later published work.
By limiting application of the fair use doctrine in cases of unpublished
works, the law ensures that the text will, ultimately, become the "work,"
that is, that it will be fixed in a tangible medium of expression and placed
into the market, in that way taking on the character of an object.
In this sense, fair use doctrine again draws questionable lines. The
law's treatment of the unpublished work as the offspring of the author
fails to account for the audience's central role in "creating" the text.
That is, upon the defendant's dissemination of a heretofore unpublished
text, the audience actualizes it, adopting it as its own. If neither "work"
nor "author" have an ontological status, then no reason-other than,
perhaps, extratextual privacy concerns-justifies limiting fair use protec-
tion for a defendant who uses an unpublished work. To withhold such
protection in effect deprives the audience of its rights to "create" the text.
C. Substantiality of the Use
The "substantiality" of the use is also relevant in fair use doc-
trine.326 Although in substantial similarity inquiry, the law at least at-
tempts to consider the text's rhetorical aspect,327 it does not do so when
determining whether a use is substantial for fair use purposes.
Rather, in assessing the "substantiality" of the use, the cases look to
both the quantity and the quality of the use.328 Quantitatively, the courts
focus on either the percentage of the defendant's text that is derived from
the plaintiff's text,329 or on the amount "taken" from the plaintiff's
text.330 This approach reduces the text to an object whose words need
only be counted to see how much was "taken."
Courts also inquire into the "qualitative" nature of the defendant's
use. 331 For example, the defendant's use has been found unfair where he
or she has taken passages that are "powerful"; 332 that go to the "heart"
of the plaintiff's work;333 that take plaintiff's "unique setting, charac-
ters, plot, and sequence of events"; 334 or that are an "important ingredi-
326. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
327. See supra part IV.A.
328. E-g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 566.
329. Id.
330. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 738 (1991) (plaintilf used a very small portion
of letters that she had received from author Richard Wright).
331. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 565.
332. Id at 564-65.
333. Id
334. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990).
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ent" of defendant's work.335 Use tends to be fair where the plaintiff's
material has "no identifiable core";336 or where the defendant's work
does no more than take enough to accomplish its parodic purpose.33
Yet again, underlying these catch-phrases is the assumption that texts
have fixed characteristics (a heart, a core) independent of an audience.
Though these terms allow for ad hoc policy decisions while at the same
time conveying the impression of meaningful interpretation, they fail to
say anything useful about the text.
D. Effect of Defendant's Use on the Market
Finally, the effect of the defendant's use on the market for plaintiff's
text is "the single most important element of fair use." 338 Undoubtedly,
this factor permits consideration of evidence that could be considered
"extratextual," for example, market data or projections as to the impact
on past and future sales of plaintiff's text.339
Yet this inquiry, too, is problematic, often focusing not on extratex-
tual issues, but on textual interpretation as a way of determining whether
the defendant's work has had an effect on the market for the plaintiff's
work.340 The concept of "potential" market poses the greatest difficul-
ties. In Rogers v. Koons,341, the defendant created a sculpture using plain-
tiff's photograph of a group of puppies. Although apparently no
evidence existed that the plaintiff could ever license his photographs to
another sculptor, the Second Circuit held that the defendant's work ad-
versely affected the potential market for plaintiff's work, concluding that
it was not implausible that another sculptor would have been willing to
purchase plaintiff's rights, and that, because defendant profited from use
of the plaintiff's work, such an adverse effect on the market was
presumed.342
Rogers' treatment of the potential market results in a circular appli-
cation of the "effect on the market" factor. The court reached its conclu-
335. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987).
336. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 738 (1991) (quoting Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987)).
337. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (1986).
338. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
339. Eg., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451-52 (1984).
340. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit found an adverse
economic impact merely because both parties were in the entertainment business, both works were
sold as printed copies, and both sounded the same. Wilson analyzes economic effect by defining the
relevant audience so broadly that it can find an adverse impact. As discussed earlier, choosing an
audience is as much an act of textual interpretation as are attempts to ascertain the text's character.
Id.
341. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
342. Id. at 312.
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sion that it was not "implausible" that another sculptor would have
sought plaintiff's rights in the photographs, not based on evidence extrin-
sic to the text, but merely because the defendant's text existed. The tex-
tual construct of "potential market" thus again derives from an attempt
to find a valid interpretation of the autonomous "work." If a reader (in
law, a court) can conceive of a potential market for something not ordi-
narily considered an "object," the "something" immediately becomes ob-
jectified, and is therefore more easily considered property. For example,
although human organs are not ordinarily thought of as objects of prop-
erty, they may become so when a "potential" market for organ trans-
plantation is conceived to exist. 34s In fair use doctrine, a plaintiff's text
without a true market tends to lose its character as a reified "object"; the
concept of potential market permits the reobjectification of the work.
Yet the conclusion that a potential market exists often derives merely
from a judge's "reading" of a text, in which he or she interprets the text
in such a way as to "create" a potential market.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed how copyright continues to rely on a
modernist notion of the autonomous "work.''344 Contemporary criticism
343. I am indebted to Peter Jaszi for this analogy.
344. The conception of the autonomous work is not limited to the case law. Commentators who
have recently inquired into the justifications for copyright also often rest their assumptions on out-
moded notions of the text. Wendy Gordon states that copyright imposes boundaries through,
among other ways, the fixation requirement and the idea/expression distinction. Gordon, Jurispru-
dence of Benefits, supra note 12, at 1380-83. (Professor Gordon also identifies the statutory grant of
only a limited set of rights as a third boundary of copyright. Id at 1382-83). Supposedly, these
boundaries "by and large, substitute well for physical boundaries, both in regard to promoting trans-
actions and to keeping liability within tolerable limits." Id. at 1380 (citations omitted). While these
boundaries are supposedly less precise than physical boundaries, they are said to function as bounda-
ries in the same way as the edges of personal property or the physical boundaries of real property do.
Id at 1383. So this approach once again relies on the traditional copyright notion of the "work":
the assumption that a text has a fixed identity, that the physical embodiment (the book) matters in
textual actualization, and that idea and expression can be located in the work with enough certainty
to permit creators to create and to avoid intolerable findings of infringement for liability. Such a
view of the work is inconsistent with current literary thought.
A similar view of the text underlies economic theories of copyright. Landes and Posner argue
that protecting expression encourages production of copyrighted works, but that protecting ideas
might actually discourage it, because supposedly, the availability of ideas is critical to producing
works. See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 347-53. They also argue that an author neither
creates nor buys stock characters and situations, but only the means of expressing them. Id. at 349-
50. Instead, because ideas and scines dfaire are supposedly "out there," the author is said to acquire
them at zero cost, "either from observation of the world around him or from works long in the
public domain." Id Giving the author copyright protection for ideas (for Landes and Posner, stock
characters and situations) would "increase the cost of expression of later authors without generating
offsetting benefits." Id. at 350. However, to describe the author as acquiring stock characters and
situations at zero cost, while investing value in the means of expressing them, begs the question,
resting on the dubious assumption that idea is an ascertainable element outside the work, while
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has emphasized how the autonomous "work" is a dubious concept that
facilitates questionable decisions that seem to rest on the valid interpreta-
tion of the work, but that in reality do not because, within the confines of
the "work," no single interpretation is valid. Moreover, the concept of
autonomous "work" tends to ignore the audience's active role in creating
the text, thus depriving the broader culture of its right to participate in
the interactive speech process that is the text.
In addition, courts have used the notion of autonomous "work" as a
rhetorical device, recharacterizing an act of speech as an object of prop-
erty. By this reification of the text as "work," opinions can employ other
rhetorical tools to justify a particular result. If the text can be treated as
akin to a tangible object, then the terms "theft," "appropriation," "pi-
rate," "harvest," and "sown" can easily flow from a judge's pen. The
threat that these powerful rhetorical devices pose to speech should not be
ignored, particularly because the seminal concept-the autonomous
work--does not accurately reflect textual function.
But copyright's image of the text differs in important ways from the
modernist, New Critical approach to the text. The New Criticism em-
braced the autonomous work as a way of mystifying it, emphasizing the
special nature of the aesthetic object (its complexity, ambiguity, etc.). In
contrast, copyright's approach to originality protects even the trivial, in
that way demystifying the text.345 Moreover, by attempting to consider
the response of the audience in deciding substantial similarity, copyright
law at least to some extent recognizes that the reader plays a role in the
textual process. So at the same time that it champions the autonomous
"work," copyright contains the seeds of the destruction of this auton-
omy. 346 Copyright law might yet accommodate an approach to the text
that pays due regard to the interest of culture's representatives-the au-
dience-in the creative process, recognizing that audiences, as well as
authors, make texts.
expression lies solely "in" the work. Again, each articulation is a text whose separation from other
textual material (including the so-called public domain) cannot be fixed. Authors may invest much
in what Landes and Posner call "idea": the success of the producer of a text might be in his or her
very ability to observe the world and the public domain and to make prudent choices. This is no less
the author's text than is the so-called means of expressing them. Indeed, the distinction between
method of expression-which sounds much like "form"-and stock situations ("content") is a ques-
tionable one: modem literary thought-building on the New Criticism-rejects the traditional divi-
sion between form and content. Because content derives its reality from the structure of the text, the
dichotomy is illusory. Harari, Preface, in TEXTUAL STRATEOiEs, supra note 7, at 27.
345. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. I am indebted to Mark Rose for pointing out
these distinctions.
346. Jane Gaines writes: "Copyright doctrine poses a greater danger to traditional literary the-
ory since it negates the contradictory philosophical foundations of traditional literary theory." JANE
M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE (1991).
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